Embodied meaning in architectural experience by Evans, J. Chris (Jon Chris)
IMMINENCE AND IMMANENCE:
Embodied Meaning In Architectural Experience
by
J. Chris Evans
Bachelor of Architecture
University of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona
May 1990
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Architecture in Architecture Studies
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 1992
@ J. Chris Evans 1992. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants MIT
permission to reproduce and distribute publicly copies
of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of the Author_
Certified by.
Chris Evans
Department of Architecture
May 8, 1992
Frdncesco Passanti
Assistant Professor of the History of Architecture
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Julian Beinart
Chairman
Departmental Committee for Graduate Students
Rotch
MASSACHIUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
JUN 05 1992
LIbfltIn S
___

IMMINENCE AND IMMANENCE:
Embodied Meaning in Architectural Experience
by
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abstract:
This thesis is an investigation of the natural or bodily-based
meaning of architecture, understood in terms of the inherent
qualities and relationships that arise out of movement within the
built environment, and based in a contemporary understanding
of the relationship between man and world. This work attempts a
fundamental grounding of discussions of architectural meaning,
through the rigorous application of our ever expansive knowledge
base onto the realities of building and basic human understanding.
Taking from environmental and perceptual psychology, and the
cognitive sciences, the intent is to evolve a dialectic between science
and contemporary theory that can advance our knowledge for
architecture.
This investigation of embodied experience revolves around
two primary focal points. First, the increasing emphasis on vision
and abstract objectivity has limited the range of the meaningful, and
has led to a focus on abstract, intellectual meaning; this work
attempts to demonstrate the potential that an interactive and
complementary juxtaposition of kinesthetic signification could have.
Second, architecture's greatest potency arises when it is considered in
terms of the experience of both space and time -- specifically
movement and the relationships between spaces that result from
this movement. The body may be seen as a "paradigmatic ruler," a
measuring tool for spatial experience, which in fact measures the
spatially implicit meaning in bodily experience. Thus, this thesis is
about trying to resolve the difficult juxtaposition of the transcendent
qualities of embodied meaning with issues of time and movement, in
order to derive an architecture fundamentally grounded in the body.
The thesis surveys a cross-section of research and theory
loosely categorized into three realms: embodied understanding,
embodied meaning in architecture, and aesthetic issues of time and
movement. The intent is to give direction to possible theories of
architecture grounded in embodiment. This consideration of
embodied meaning does not attempt to suggest an alternative to
conscious, culturally-based meaning, nor to perpetuate the mind-
body split; rather the intent is to offer another frame of emphasis
within our consciousness, and indicate the possibilities of the
interaction and integral relationship between the intellectual and
embodied realms, in designing for the modern world.
Thesis Supervisor: Francesco Passanti
Title: Assistant Professor of the History of Architecture
Submitted to the Department of
Architecture on May 8, 1992 in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in
Architecture Studies.
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"Buildings can speak to us, even if they cannot explain."
Mary Macleod
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INTRODUCTION
13

The entry sequence into the Protestant Memorial Chapel at
the Dachau concentration camp is a series of kinesthetic experiences
that engage, immerse and manipulate the human body for effect. The
access to the chapel begins across an expanse of dirt and gravel with
little or no attempt to beautify the exterior- -,en in composition.
The chapel emerges from this plane without pretense , to meet the
visitor. The entry is down a fairly wide expanse of stardy detailed,
concrete stairs that narrow in their descent. At six or seven feet
below grade the stairs become a still narrowing path, an experience
of constriction, which is eventually subsumed by a cantilevered plane
of solid concrete. The extraordinary experience is that of the
overhead plane itself, which cantilevers to within a few feet of the far
wall of the dark and subterranean path. The visitor's own perception
of mass and cantilever pulls this plane downward, imposing upon
him, disconcerting. The path continues down, jaggedly curving to
the left as it narrows, thus interrupting any possible visual connection
to the anticipated goal, before finally releasing into an open,
orthogonal space that reaches vertically and captures the sky above.
The interaction of body and space through movement
engages our perceptual consciousness. Architecture's substance is
defined by its relationship to human beings -- its meaning is a
reflection of our interpretation. And part of that interpretation arises
from our bodily experience.
This thesis attempts a fundamental grounding of the
consideration of meaning in architecture. It is my contention that the
production of architecture can best be served through the application
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of our contemporary understanding of ourselves and the processes
we go through in the perception and understanding of our
environment. A considerable portion of our architectural discourse
has become entangled in philosophical rhetoric, losing sight of the
relationship between architecture and basic human understanding. I
would like to re-introduce and re-evaluate (in light of our greater
self-understanding) a banal and familiar concept into the equation of
architecture, which has, through constant intellectual analysis, been
repressed and subverted: embodied meaning. More specifically, the
intent is to study the embodied and kinesthetic experience of the
environment, what we know about how we perceive and come to
understand our eivironment, and the potential meaning this
experience may have for us. We experience the world through a
pre-conceptual dimension of consciousness, which, disguised in an
aura of obviousness and implicitness, conceals from our analysis the
way we engage the world .
Architecture's gains significance when it is considered in
terms of the experience of space and time: specifically the
experience of movement and the relationship between spaces that
result from this movement. The body may be seen as a
"paradigmatic ruler,"1 a measuring tool for spatial experience, which
in fact measures spatially implicit meaning in bodily experience.
The thesis thus attempts to derive fundamental principles of the
human body's interaction with physical form in the four-
dimensionality of space-time. The focus is first and foremost on
perception and understanding, and theories of reception, rather than
production or expression. But the goal of this inquiry is to provide a
medium for the understanding of reception, in order to ultimately
produce a better architecture.
The increasing emphasis on vision and representation in
design has brought about a simplification of the architectural
experience; architecture has often become the equivalent of a two-
dimensional representation of itself. Architecture that is a function
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of vision contributes to its own consumption. Embodiment has the
capacity to transcend architectural commodification because the
emphasis is on physical interaction, which no photograph can
accomodate. This over emphasis on surface representation has
limited the range of the meaningful. Partly a manifestation of
modernity's reduction to vision as a substitute for our total
understanding of the world, the emphasis on vision in architecture
has led to a focus on conceptual and therefore primarily cultural
symbols: symbols to be registered, processed and analyzed through
an active reading of the architectural participant. A theory of
embodied meaning does not assume or necessitate such an active
reading by the subject. In contrast, this thesis explores the potential
that an interactive and complementary juxtaposition of kinesthetic
signification could have. The focus here is thus on space and
embodied experience, rather than form and vision. Embodied
experience incorporates all of the senses, including vision, and places
them in relation to one another in order to provide a total perception.
The focus on language in contemporary architecture is partly
a product of a philosophical position that has become preoccupied
with the elimination of vagueness and ambiguity in the terms of
discourse, resting "on the assumption that much depends upon the
meaning of our terms, and that we operate with this meaning" 2
However, Karl Popper notes that progress in the sciences is less
concerned with the precision of its terms than it is with a range of
reasonable accessibility. He suggests that there ought to be
limitations to, not the elimination of, vagueness and ambiguity.3 The
fundamentally abstract language of architecture has often allowed
itself to become caught in this web of definition. The necessity of
architecture to be explanatory and precise is doubly confirmed not
only by explicit cultural references in some cases (as in Post-
Modernism's historicism), but also by the necessity to confirm the
significance of the work through accompanying texts to the
architectural community -- which obviously have little impact on
2Popper, Sir Karl, Popper:
Selections (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press,
1985), p. 99.
3Ibid., p. 97-98.
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those who experience the architecture everyday. Thus vision, which
gives us access to extensively explicit information, is not seen as
primary, but is given absolute authority in order to define an
architecture that explains itself.
I want to emphasize that this is not an attempt to suggest an
alternative to culturally-based meaning, or to deny the extent of its
value. But overly-intellectual constructs have tended to devalue, or
eliminate completely the role of bodily interaction with our physical
surroundings. I believe this has been, in part, a result of the
perceived obviousness and irrationality of bodily experience, and the
objective construct of an abstract mind separate from a concrete
body. This work will attempt to transcend the mind-body dichotomy
and indicate how these two layers of meaning in the relatively
abstract realm of architecture may find greater significance when
considered together. A theory of architecture which mediates the
juxtaposition of bodily pre-consciousness and intellectual
consciousness, and acknowledges the potential of the complex
interactions between these realms of meaning, more closely
approximates actual experience. The intent is to explore the
interactive character of the mind and body, and to consider how the
mind and body work as a single entity in the perception and
comprehension of the environment.
When we speak of the perceptual body, we begin to address
essential commonalities of human architectural experience. The
search for essence is not a search for an idea defined by discourse. It
is an exploration of the physical world relative to us and relevant for
us; in terms of our own understanding. To discover these
commonalities, we need to look at what makes experience possible.
These commonalities arise out of the essential characteristics of the
human interaction with the environment, based on those qualities
which define us: body shape, form structure, our way of perceiving
and traversing the world. Louis Kahn was one of the first architects
of modernity who professed a search for the essentials. But the
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intangibility of Kahn's personal and spiritual search made it difficult
to advance his work. This thesis is an attempt to get at the tangible
end of essence; the experience of the body--common to all of us--
perhaps has the capacity to bring essence and existence together. But
we must also remember that reality is not constituted through such
commonalities: we must remain indeterminists to be sure. We must
always keep the context under consideration, and realize that the
situation is idealized.
I am not claiming to have discovered what our essence
ultimately is, rather my use of the term stems from Popper:
"Although I do not think we can ever describe, by our universal laws,
an ultimate essence of the world, I do not doubt that we may seek to
probe deeper and deeper into the structure of our world, or as we
might say, into properties of the world that are more and more
essential, or of greater and greater depth."4 It is what might be
described as a modified essentialism that accepts that we do not have
full knowledge of the essence of our own being. But with further
excavation we can get closer to more basic, essential principles.
"The depth of a scientific theory seems to be most closely related to
its simplicity and so to the wealth of its content."5 Immanence may
be revealed through the excavation of the layers of our
consciousness. We need to discover what makes experience
possible, in order to be more aware of what experience is. This
thesis thus searches for patterned regularities in the way we
understand our environment, as a tool to guide architecture away
from arbitrary preferences.
A considerable amount of research has been done recently,
in a wide range of fields, on the processes human beings go through
in the perception and understanding of our environment. These
advances have yet to be dealt with in terms of architecture. It is my
contention that real progress in architecture at this moment can be
4Popper, p. 167.
5bid., p. 167.
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Body Movement Coping with
the Environment (New York:
Gordon and Breach Science
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made through the rigorous application of our ever-expansive
knowledge base. This study attempts to bring these scientific
advances of self-knowledge together and begins to reconsider
architectural directions in the light of such knowledge. In the context
of design, there does not appear to be as yet a viable theory which
fundamentally relates people and buildings to one another. Taking
from environmental and perceptual psychology and the cognitive
sciences, the intent is to evolve a dialectic between science and
contemporary theory that can advance our knowledge of architecture.
Rather than looking at the world separate from ourselves, we need to
explore the ways we engage our world. Architecture still tends to
rely on intuitio.. 'n places where the greater understanding of the
human mind could become a teachable platform for students to build
from. It may be possible to use the sciences to minimize the
unknown, and provide working tools for the imagination. This is in
no way meant to be exclusionary of art and intuition, rather, by
searching for an order that is a form of self-knowledge we may have
the opportunity to broaden the reach of architecture. By focusing on
the receiver and the perceptual commonalities, we can inform our
production. "'There is mystery enough in the wonder of (the body's)
creation and operation without creating a mystique of ignorance
around what can be known." 6
This consideration of the commonalities of embodiment as a
function of self-knowledge may have the capacity to transcend the
ever-widening gap between those who produce architecture and
those who experience it. In our constant dialogue and analysis we
generate new perspectives on architecture's content and form, but
there is a potential danger: our emphasis on analysis allows us to
forget our audience. It is easy to get caught up in the philosophy
and push aside the possibility of other aspects, and forget that
architecture can be experienced at a non-verbal level. Our
intellectual analysis often blocks any deeper reading. "Between the
self that analyzes perception and the self which perceives there is
Introduction
always a distance." 7 The problem is not the inherent gap, but rather
when the split is not recognized, and objective analysis is equated
with reception. This split is , however, not limited to architecture: it
is more fundamentally a characteristic of the entirety of our modem
existence. Alan Calquhoun has noted that "during the last 250 years,
it has become increasingly possible to detach the aesthetic reception
of works from the conditions of their creation...the space of
possibilities of the artist and that of the spectator no longer
coincides."8 The possibility of truly communicating through an
unstable sign system such as architecture continues to diminish. This
is why architects today have to be as much archaeologists and
sociologists as they are philosophers and formalists; they must also
explore the psyche to understand what meaning is to those around
them.
7Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The
Phenomenology of Perception(London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul Ltd., 1962), p. 43.
8Calquhoun, Alan. "Post-
Modernism and Structuralism:
A Retrospective Glance," in
Assemblage Vol. 5 (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1988), p. 15.
Although embodied experience is fundamental to the total
architectural experience, the amount of research conducted on this
subject is remarkably limited. However, theoretical contributions
have, by the subject's very nature, a long, if not extensive, history.
Considerations of the body in theory go as far back as theory itself,
to Vitruvius' classical discussions of scale. But most engagement of
the body remained limited. It was not until the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries that Laugier articulated a consideration of
the origins of built form. His "Primitive Hut" was an attempt,
however culturally bound, to fix some conception of what the earliest
and most fundamental built structures may have been. Although
Laugier addressed the 'essential' character of architecture, the work
still failed to make any connection in the relationship between the
perceptual body and the physical form. In the late nineteenth century
the fundamental characteristics of embodiment and perception were
extensively considered. As man became more conscious of his own
being and own history, he began to engage in explorations for self-
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"Schmarsow's Conception of
Space", Assemblage Vol. 15
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991),
p. 56.
10Ibid., p. 54,57, 58.
knowledge. The forty years between 1890 and 1930 were perhaps
the most productive years in forging an understanding of architecture
as a function of the human perceptual body. Schmarsow, a German
art historian of the period, brought embodiment and essence together
in his conception of "Raumgestaltung," or 'space-forming'. Using the
perceptual empiricism of nineteenth century psychologists as his
foundation, Schmarsow reconsidered architecture as a spatial
phenomenon. "Despite substantial differences, the empiricist
theories...all shared the belief that spatial ideas are not a priori
intuitions but the fusion of impressions of bodily movements on the
mind. Schmarsow's indebtedness to nineteenth century theories of
optial perception lay in his acceptance of this associationist
theorizing." 9 His realization that our perception of the architectural
environment was a product of the senses in relation to bodily
movement--kinesthetic perception--was a clear advance. Thus
spatial form took shape through the interaction of bodily structure,
nature and movement. Schmarsow's most profound observation
came through in the interpretation and understanding of perceptual
activity. Depth perception was inexplicable through conventional
understandings of vision. Psychologists had conceived that the
sensation of depth was developed through the relationship of vision
to human movement, and that a conception of depth could only arise
out of the comparison of one perception relative to the next. Thus,
he conceived of spatial thinking as a specific realm in itself within
consciousness. While Schmarsow had a very clear picture of
architecture as space, he did not consider space in terms of meaning,
and he failed to adequately relate perception to cultural
phenomena,.10
Bringing a more empirical perspective to architectural
perceptual aesthetics was the Vkhutemas (Higher State Artistic
Technical Studies), an academic institution of architecture in the
Soviet Union. From 1917 to 1927, under the direction of Nikolai
Ladovsky, the state's newly found social concern and responsibility
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was a fundamental impetus for the new academies that emerged.
Thus, schools of art, like the Vkhutemas, became much more
involved in the study of reception than in production. This was a
significant shift in terms of architectural education. The three
introductory courses at the Vkhutemas were space, color and volume,
corresponding to architecture, painting and sculpture. 'Two theories
developed by Ladovsky--space as the primary material of
architecture and perceptual psychology--were accepted without
debate in the Vkhutemas in 1921 as fundamental principles in the
formation of the new architecture." 11 Space took a different form
from the traditional conceptions: architecture built around the notion
of 'space' helped to undermine the conventional concept of space that
had been based on the singular perspective. Space had evolved into
space-time: it became continuous and non-hierarchical . Many
factors could be seen as contributing to this development, but two
seem most prominent: Einstein's theory of relativity, and the
perception as a function of movement, both of which brought a
temporal variable into the equation of space. Ladovsky's interest in
perceptual psychology led him to open his Psycho-Technical
Research Laboratory in 1927. In a search for a collective and class-
less architecture, Ladovsky sought universal principles of human
perception, trying to identify an objective foundation upon which the
new architecture for the new state could develop. 12 In his search for
universal principles of perception in order to make architecture
understandable to all people, Ladovsky stressed "possibility and
multiplicity rather than determinism and triviality." 13
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century studies on
perceptual psychology did have a significant impact on modernism,
but primarily in an indirect way. Although the articulation of space
in modernism tended toward formal explorations, there were obvious
and prominent exceptions. Mies' Barcelona Pavilion and much of
LeCorbusier's work engaged a moving subject. After LeCorbusier
had spent considerable time in Africa, he noted: "Arab architecture
11Gaspar, Zsuzsanna,
"Vkhutemas: The Emergence of
a New Type of Architectural
Education in the Soviet Union,"
unpublished essay.
12Ladovsky's work was a
continuation of psycho-physical
research in the arts by Hugo
Munsterberg of Harvard
University.
13Gaspar, p. 8. For further
information of the concept of
varied experience in perceptual
psychology, see Fiske, D., and
Maddi, S. Functions of Varied
Experience (Homewood,
Illinois: The Dorsey Press,
1961).
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14 quoted in "At the End of the
Architectural Promenade," in
Architecture and Body by Lars
Lerup, translated from Oeuvre
Complet de 1910-1929;
LeCorbusier and Pierre
Jeanneret (Zurich: Editions Dr.
H. Girsberger, 1937), p. 24.
gives us a precious piece of information. It is appreciated while
walking, with the feet; it is walking, while moving ,that one sees the
development of the architectural order. It is a principle contrary to
the one used by baroque architecture that is conceived on paper from
a fixed theoretical point. I prefer the insights of Arab
architecture." 14
LeCorbusier conceived of his Villa Savoye as an "architectural
promenade," an experience of movement within space, but also as a
continuity of movement beyond the house itself. But throughout the
height of the modernist period there were no real considerations of
the signification of embodied experiences. Most of modernism
looked to other realms: technology, function, social issues, and
geometrical form. Ultimately, the mute formalism that evolved
brought about the onslaught of post-modem architecture and a
discourse that attempted to engage some form of language in the
urban environment.
There has been considerable discussion regarding meaning in
architecture for the past thirty years, but this consideration has tended
towards the conceptual and intellectual realms, as opposed to
embodied meaning. The perceived banality of typical experience has
tended to allow this subject matter to go unnoticed, with few
exceptions. Christian Norberg-Schulz, in his works Intentions in
Architecture and Existence Space and Architecture considered space
and spatial phenomena as primary in a modem consideration of
architecture. Taking from Heidegger, Norberg-Schulz emphasized
place and dwelling in his consideration of existential or psychic
space. Dwelling represented the fundamental character of the way
we as human beings exist here on Earth. Norberg-Schulz, attempting
to build on perceptual and Gestalt psychology, argued that we
experience the world through schematizations, on the basis that
certain perceptual properties of the environment remain constant.
Schemata represented systems of perceptual coherence that were
connected to particular stimuli. Although Norberg-Schulz did not
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extensively deal with perceptual experience separate from the
impacts of cultural phenomena, his work still offered a significant
departure in its search for meaning in space. But even though
Norberg-Schulz engaged space and experience, he did so from a
perspective of abstract, objective rationality, that was selective in an
analysis of reception. Architecture, he said, cannot take the
immediate experience as its point of departure.
What one describes in this way are subjective architectural
experiences, and one would have to arrive at the absurd conclusion
that 'architecture comes into being only when experienced.' It is,
therefore, nonsense to say that man is always the center of
'architectural' space, and that the directions of architectural space
change with movements of the human body. Architectural space
certainly exists independently of the casual perceiver, and has centers
and directions of its own. 15
Yet it is questionable why one should be concerned about
architecture when it is not within the perception of human beings.
This statement testifies to Norberg-Schulz's formalist and fully
objective position, his apprehension toward relativism, and
ultimately indicates why much of his discussion tended to be
unfruitful: although his work revolves around a nostalgia for place
and place-making, which pre-suppose human presence, his position
fails to engage reception or the way in which people engage their
environment at an embodied or pre-conceptual level. "The new
synthesis of logic and empiricism of our day has taught us that it is
meaningless to assume that domains of knowledge exist where the
intellect is not competent."16 Although Norberg-Schulz attempted
to engage the body, meaning was still posited as a function of
conceptual structures (i.e. - in our reflection upon experience), and
did not engage the body in terms of perceptual comprehension.
Likewise, Kent Bloomer's and Charles Moore's 1977 Body, Memory
and Architecture had difficulty resolving the same dilemma: how to
consider the body at a pre-conceptual level.
As architectural meaning drew closer to two-dimensional
representation--architecture as a purely visual phenomenon--new
15Norberg-Schulz, Christian,
Existence, Space and
Architecture (London: Studio
Vista, 1971), p.13 .
16Norberg-Schulz, Christian,
Intentions in Architecture
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965)
p. 82.
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approaches to architecture emphasized the experiential; some turned
to phenomenology. Phenomenology addresses the discrepancy
between the analysis of our world and our experience; it attempts to
describe and explain our experience of the environment.
Phenomenology asks the question "What does architecture mean?"
The phenomenological view is taken by those primarily interested in
looking at architecture as an artifact, as opposed to semiological
models--which ask the question "How does architecture
communicate meaning?"--which may be appropriated in the interest
of designing architecture. Although phenomenology has had success
in considering meaning and experience in terms of the body
(although always defined in the context of the total experience), it
has been less successful in generating methodologies for
architectural design. Thus, this thesis enters into a discourse which
needs to address the discrepancies between architectural analyses,
oriented to the way we apprehend meaning, and those responsive to
the necessity for models for design implementation.
This thesis thus surveys a wide range of ideas from an
equally dispersed array of fields. The material investigated comes
under three main classifications: 1) embodied understanding, 2)
embodied meaning in architecture, and 3) time, movement and
relationships in aesthetic theory. The research comes out of
environmental psychology, cognitive sciences, and contemporary
aesthetic theories. None of the works, in themselves, are complete
when it comes to discussing architecture and body, but by
considering them together and interactively, we get a clearer
understanding of embodied experience than we otherwise could.
There will of course be criticism of this dispersal of research sources,
as either not being rigorous, or for not considering that the
foundational assumptions of such theories might not coincide, and
could possibly be found to be in opposition. But rather than dispersal
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as being a weakness, it may be a strength, because exclusivity denies
the possibility of alternative thoughts and considerations to arise
from their interaction. The different ways of conceiving our world
also allow for a form of empirical confirmation of similar ideas in
different realms, and perhaps provides a way of perceiving the
problems in one or another, and eliminating any ambiguity in both.
Chapter One surveys four primary texts on perception, our
understanding of perception at a pre-conscious level, and our ways of
conceiving of and analyzing perception and its impact on how we
relate to the world. The following chapter relates this understanding
of perception specifically to architecture, and looks at recent theories
of embodied meaning in architecture. Chapter Three investigates
theories of time and movement in the aesthetic realm. Finally,
Chapter Four attempts to indicate possible directions and points of
departure for the development of a synthesized, comprehensive
theory of embodied kinesthetic meaning in architecture. While none
of the separate investigations of each topic claim to be complete, it is
hoped that the survey of the material will suffice to bring up as
many relevant issues as possible. This thesis thus seeks to reveal
certain consistencies in human understanding, and to demonstrate the
implications of embodied meaning on architectural design. The goal
is to demonstrate the embodiment's substance and value, its
applicability, and to define the rules of its use; as well as to offer an
alternative focus in the conception of meaning in architecture.
Because of obvious variations between people and cultures, any
principles discovered herein should be considered as guidelines, not
as laws. Ultimately, the goals of this thesis can be reduced to
outline a value system -- a system which hopes to improve the
quality of life by expanding the range of human experience and by
understanding the relationships between people and their
environment.
Introduction
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A theory of embodied meaning in architecture requires a
conception of embodied understanding--how we come to
comprehend what our senses tell us. In order to develop a theory of
embodied understanding, we need to look at perceptual psychology;
the work of J.J. Gibson has assumed a funaamuental role in all late
twentieth century perceptual psychology. In his book The Senses
Considered as Perceptual Systems, Gibson clearly defines the focus
of his study; he distinguishes perception, ways of seeking and
extracting information, separately from sensation and emotion.
Sensation might be defined as the impression made on a perceiver
while he or she is engaged in detecting the world.1 Gibson suggests
that the inflow of perceptual information does not coincide with the
inflow of sensation; thus we can detect something without the
accompaniment of sense impressions. The subjectivity of sensations
is cumbersome for analysis because of the difficulty in cataloging the
vague responses of introspection, which are required to access
sensations. (While he does not deny the productivity of introspection
in terms of perception, he does suggest that it has limitations which
may be overcome when perceptiun is considered in relation to the
study of animals.) The way we apprehend information is Gibson's
focus.
Given the limits of perception, perhaps the most difficult
task is to define the parameters of how the subject obtains
information. Endless theories in architecture and elsewhere have
wandered aimlessly because of a misunderstanding of this
fundamental structure to all theories of perceptual aesthetics. Gibson
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Considered as Perceptual
Systems (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1966), p. 99.
2 bid., p. 33.
3Ibid., p. 4. Although the
auditory system may have a
certain impact on architecture,
there is nothing truly revealing
offered in Gibson's account;for
more information on the role
hearing plays in our experience
of architecture, see
bibliography.
argues that conventional experiments of perceptual psychology tend
to be with passive participants; and although such experimentation
has provided substantial knowledge about passive receptivity, they
tend to be unsatisfactory because they do not explain how we
accomplish sense perception. As an example, Gibson points out our
tendency to equate the eye with a camera; but the eye is obviously
not a camera in the sense that it is self-focusing, self-setting and self-
orienting.2 Much of our perceptual ability requires human action.
But at the other extreme, many of those who do build upon
perceptual psychology tend to assume vast supplementation of
perception from cognitive activity. Gibson emphasizes that
perception can take place without the intervention of intellectual
systems. Instead, he proposes that within perception there are both
active perceptual organs and passive receptors. Active systems
search, although this does not necessarily assume a conscious search,
whereas passive systems respond.
Gibson describes five separate sense modalities somewhat
distinct from conventional sense categorization; these are basic-
orientation, haptic, vision, auditory and taste-smell. Only three of
these explorations, however--haptic, basic-orientation, and vision--
provide any new insight into our understanding of architecture. 3
There are two key factors that determine our perceptions. The first is
that all of the perceptual systems overlap one another in their
apprehension of information: they are not, in our own processing,
mutually exclusive. As we explore, information is picked up by one
or a combination of perceptual systems. When the senses work
together they confirm one another. The second aspect is not only
core to Gibson's theory of active perception, it is absolutely
fundamental to this thesis: the apprehension of stimulation and
information is primarily mediated by bodily movement of some
kind. The concept of kinesthesis, which may be defined as
sensitivity to and registration of one's own body movement in
relation to the changing perceptions of the transformed environment,
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pervades all of the senses (especially those that are significant to
architecture), and is almost never specific to any one perceptual
system. Stimuli is obtained through movement, and not imposed
simply upon passive, static human beings. Kinesthesis produces
temporal as well as spatial understanding.
The basic-orienting perceptual system provides a frame of
reference for all of the other senses to actively or passively obtain
information. The vestibular apparatus of the inner ear responds to
gravity transitions in movement and correlates equilibrium: "It can
specify starts and stops, pushes or pulls, or positive and negative
accelerations in a horizontal direction. It can probably register short
motions place to place, but not motion as such."4 It is responsive to
the rhythm of our bodies in pedestrian motion. Ultimately the basic-
orienting system, by co-varying with the haptic system, provides a
double registration of the ground and our orientation to gravity and
makes upright posture possible. And from a balanced state, other
perceptions may take place.
The haptic system has a complex set of receptors throughout the
body that respond to more than just that which we refer to as 'touch'
or temperature, and more than we account for through personal
reflection. "The inputs of reportable sensation, as these have been
catalogued by introspection, are evidently quite inadequate to
account for the richness of haptic perception." 5 Along with actual
interaction with objects, the haptic system picks up body movement,
body position or poses, through the sensitivity of joints: the receptors
provide a sort of three-dimensional grid that registers the position of
the body relative to the force of gravity and the actual physical
connection between body and ground. "The haptic system, then, is
an apparatus by which the individual gets information about both the
environment, and his body. He feels an object relative to the body
and the body relative to an object. It is the perceptual system by
which animals and men are literally in touch with the environment."6
4Ibid., p. 69.
5Ibid., p. 134.
6Ibd., p. 97.
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9 Jbid., p. 40.
10 Ibid., p. 276.
The visual system overlaps all other perceptual systems to
register a certain 'objectivity' through its capacity for confirmation,
but more importantly through the trust that has been established in it
as a system. "Vision is useful," Gibson says, "for 1) detecting the
layout of the surroundings, 2) detecting changes, and 3) detecting
and controlling locomotion. In each of these ways vision may pick
up a) only gross differences, b) intermediate differences, or c) all
these plus small and subtle differences." 7 These changes or
differences require a temporal condition, however brief. Vision has
become the dominant system in man because the opportunities for
information perception are so vast, when sight is considered as a
function of movement. "When the forms of the optic array at one
station point are supplemented with all possible transformations to
other station points, and when sequence over time is added to order
in space and all motions are considered, it is obvious that the
specifying capacity of this super-stimulus is unlimited. It is an
inexhaustible reservoir of potential information about the world and
about the individual's behavior in it."8
According to Gibson, the natural structure of the
environment, as we perceive it, consists of both spatial and
temporal order. "A natural stimulus for ...perception has the
following characteristics. First it always has some degree of adjacent
order: a structure or pattern in relation to a receiver. Second, it
always has some degree of successive order: sequential structure.
And third, it always , therefore, has some component of non-change
and some component of change." 9 Kinesthesis requires a temporal
order; one of the failures of conventional studies of perception is the
idea that 'space' is perceived, whereas 'time' is remembered. Gibson
suggests that in the short term, our perception of "natural
stimulations consist of successions as truly as it consists of
adjacencies." 10 Thus true memory storage is not required for the
perception of succession. Instead, as evidenced in Gibson's theory
on perceptual learning, successive order is a function of the
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relationships that arise in time; there is a perceptual continuity in the
blending of perceptions from one moment to the next. Experimental
research seems to indicate that the improvement of perceptual skills
is an improvement in attention, and an increased 'noticing' of critical
differences, with less noticing of irrelevancies. "The 'differentiation
theory' of perceptual learning" as Gibson identifies it, is the process
of "learning what to attend to, both overtly and covertly. For the
perception of objects it is the detection of distinctive features and the
abstraction of general properties."11 The detection of similarity or
difference reflects the perceptual system's earlier adjustment or
"tuning" to the preceding stimulus; and because the system has
already perceived certain constants of stimulus information, it is
already in a position to perceive those elements again, and take note
of the critical differences. Thus we find that the transformations of
pattems are just as stimulating as the patterns themselves are.
Gibson argues that within both adjacent and successive order exist
'perceptual invariants.' "Besides the changes in stimuli from place to
place and from time to time, it can also be shown that certain higher-
order variables--stimulus energy, ratios and proportions, for
example--do not change. They remain invariant with movements of
the observer and with changes in the intensity of stimulation...These
invariants...correspond to the permanent properties of the
environment." He suggests that invariants of perception are
indicative of the invariants of our meaningful world. 12
Gibson argues that the natural structure of perceptual
stimulation from the environment has meaning. It is not untypical to
find theories of signification denying meaningful substance within
the perceptual level because of the difficulty and confusion we find
in attempting to represent it. He identifies three general types of
meaning: that which is the result of the natural structure of the
environment, that which is a result of our representations (such as
verbal representation), and meaning that is a product of socially
coded or conventional signals (culturally defined common
1 IIbid., p. 52, 270.
12Ibid., p. 3, 284.
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13Ibid., p. 245. understandings). 13 Our comprehension of each form of meaning is
progressively less and less direct (In other words, representations are
less direct than natural structures, and social codes are less direct
than representations), which therefore require greater and greater
knowledge to extract meaning. He demonstrates this distinction
between natural structures and representations through the
comparison of the schematic models of verbal meaning and
perceptual meaning.
Perceptual Environmental stimulus
meaning source Physical invariant Psychological Percept
law resonance
Verbal Referent Symbol 
- Thought
meaning Social or word PsychologicalT
Convention association
Although this diagram and its structure are somewhat questionable,
the key significance lies in Gibson's acknowledgment of the
existence of these spheres of meaning, and the distinction between
them.
But whereas Gibson indicates the existence of 'spheres' of
meaning, Mark Johnson proposes a model of understanding
constructed around similar distinctions of meaning but organized as
'layers.' In his 1987 book The Body in the Mind, Johnson challenges
conventional objectivist approaches to the question of how man
experiences the world. Objectivist theories treat meaning as an
abstract, ahistorical, disembodied phenomena, and often organize
themselves around logic and language. Objectivism, since Descartes,
tends to split mind and body; it creates a gap:
...between our cognitive, conceptual, formal or rational side in
contrast with our bodily, perceptual, material and emotional side.
The most significant consequence of this split is that all meaning,
logical connection, conceptualization and reasoning are aligned with
the mental or rational dimension, while perception, imagination and
feeling are aligned with the bodily dimension. As a result, both non-propositional and figuratively elaborated structures of experience are
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regarded as having no place in meaning and the drawing of rational
inferences. 14
Johnson argues that this gap partly arises in the discrepancy between
our attempts at theory-neutral analysis and the reality of our
experience. "Objectivism treats all meaning as conceptually and
propositionally expressible in literal terms that can correspond to
objective aspects of reality." 15 Although it is necessary that we use
propositional language to describe our experience, we must not
mistake our mode of description for that which is described.
Alternatively, Johnson argues that any account of meaning
must give a central place to embodied and imaginative structures of
understanding. "The key to an adequate response to this (mind/body)
crisis is to focus on something that has been ignored and undervalued
in Objectivist accounts of meaning and rationality--the human body,
and especially those structures of...understanding that emerge from
our embodied experience." 16 Our understanding of the world is
partly a product of our bodily experience. Understanding is not
simply after-the-fact reflections on experience (i.e. representations) it
is rather the means by which we have those experiences in the first
place. It is the way in which we apprehend the world at all levels.
Understanding is never merely a matter of holding beliefs, either
consciously or unconsciously. More basically, one's understanding is
one's way of being in, or having, a world. This is very much a matter
of one's embodiment, that is, of perceptual mechanisms, patterns of
discrimination, motor programs, and various bodily skills. And it is
equally a matter of our embeddedness within culture, language,
institutions and historical traditions. 17
There are embodied structures of understanding that allow us to have
a meaningful world, and these embodied structures are a result of our
interaction with, and our experience of the world. Experience is not
here considered as perceptual phenomena of passively received sense
impressions, but is inclusive of all those things that make us human:
from basic perceptual and motor programs to emotional, historical
social and linguistic dimensions. Yet embodiment is a significant
14Johnson, Mark, The Body in
the Mind (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press,
1987), p. xxv.
15Ibid., p. 5.
16Ibid., p. 1v.
17Ibid., p. 137.
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to permit inferences." Ibid., p.
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and fundamental part of all experience and indicates a certain
commonality between people. "...Because our bodies are very much
alike with respect to their physiological makeup we would expect to
find commonly shared (if not universal) gestalt structures for many
of our physical interactions within our environment." 18 According
to Johnson, all knowledge of experience must have two components:
some perceptual content that goes to the senses, and mental
structures to organize and make sense of such content. While Gibson
had concentrated on how the former took place, Johnson's focus is on
creating a model for the latter.
The method I employ might be called a form of descriptive or
empgrical phenomenology, in that I will be attempting a kind of
'geography of human experience.' Such a geography seeks to
identify the chief contours (structures) and connections that our
experience and understanding exhibit. It would explore the
emergence of comprehensible form and organization in our
experience and the means we have of making sense of it. The test of
its success is comprehensiveness, coherence, and explanatory
power.19
He is attempting to reveal the connections between our experience
and our understanding. Similar to Gibson's divisions of meaning,
Johnson is exploring non-propositional 20 and pre-representational
structures of meaning that lay the foundation for conceptual and
propositional forms. Rather than simply acknowledging the
differences, as Gibson does, Johnson is attempting to relate these
layers of meaning in some fundamental way.
Johnson argues that we derive abstract meaning out of
recurring patterns of embodied experience. Image schemata, as he
identifies them, are organizing structures of our experience and
understanding that evolve out of bodily movements and perceptual
interactions. Johnson notes that typical schema models of cognitive
theory suggest that we order our knowledge through skeletal
structures and detailed properties that provide an abstract framework
for recurring patterns of experience. If we conceive of schemata as
'scripts,' for example, they would include elements such as
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characters, settings, sequences of events, casual connections goals,
etc.
A script is a structure that describes appropriate sequences of events
in a particular context. A script is made up of slots and requirements
about what can fill those slots. The structure is an interconnected
whole, and what is in one slot affects what can be in another. Scripts
handle stylized everyday situations. They are not subject to much
change nor do they provide the apparatus for handling totally novel
situations. Thus, a script is a pre-determined, stereo-typed sequence
of actions that defines a well-known situation.2 1
While Johnson acknowledges that these mainstream schema theories
in cognitive research are correct, he also suggests that they are
incomplete. Schema are not just templates to be filled in, he says,
but are dynamic and malleable 'plans' for interacting with the
environment. "They give expectations and anticipations that
influence our interactions with our environment. 'The schema is not
only the plan but also the executor of the plan. It is a pattern of
action as well asfor action."' 22 Further, Johnson notes that these
mainstream schema theories need to be complemented by an
exploration of schema that structure the way we experience the world
on a bodily and perceptual level. Schema pervade all levels of
understanding and have the capacity to interconnect percepts and
concepts--similar to what Gibson had described as natural structures
and representations. Image schemata are structures for cognitive
processing of our experience, prior to any conceptual thinking, and
therefore have a perceptual kinesthetic character. The mental
operations that take place within image schemata are abstract analogs
of physical experiences. Experimental evidence continues to suggest
the significance of this kind of mental processing. The schemata are
in no way rich and complex, but rather are abstracted in order to
structure a range of possibilities that fill a certain pattern.
Image schemata exist at a level of generality and abstraction that
allows them to serve repeatedly as identifying patterns in an
indefinitely large number of experiences, perceptions and image
formations for objects or events that are similarly structured in the
relevant ways. Their most important feature is that they have a few
basic elements of components that are related by definite structures
21Schank, R. and Abelson, R.,
Scripts, Plans, Goals and
Understanding (Hillsdale NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaun, 1977) p. 41.
22Johnson, quoting U. Neisser,
p. 21.
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and yet have a certain flexibility. As a result of this simple structure,
they are a chief means for achieving order in our experience so that
we can comprehend and reason about it. Typical schemata will have
parts and relations. The parts might consist of a set of entities (such
as people, props, events, states sources, goals). The relations might
include causal relations, temporal sequences, part-whole patterns,
relative locations, agent-patient structures, or instrumental relations.
Normally however, a given schema will have a small number of parts
standing in simple relations. 2 3
What image schemata do is to generate coherence for,
establish unity within and fundamentally constrain our network of
meaning. "In order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences
that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and
order to our actions, perceptions and conceptions. A schema is a
recurrent pattern, shape and regularity in, or of, these ongoing
ordering activities." 2 4 As dynamic and flexible systems, rather than
as passive receptacles, Johnson argues that meaning is constructed
and constituted through schema--meaning is not given ready-made.
Schemata do not specify the truth conditions of reality, but rather,
underlie that reality, and help to make it coherent for us by imposing
a relative stability on our meaning structure. This stability, although
originating as a function of our shared embodiment, is primarily a
product of schemata becoming conventionally situated within our
network of meaning. Embodied image schemata, patterns which
exist pre-conceptually in our experience "have sufficient internal
structure to generate (rational) entailments and constrain references,
and thus to be propositionally elaborated." 25 Image schemata have
an internal structure which constrains our understanding and generate
definite patterns; in other words, they establish a range of possible
patterns of understanding and reasoning. Therefore, Johnson argues,
"much of the structure we find in the social, epistemic, and
conversational or speech act domains is intimately related to parallel
structure in our embodied experience." 2 6 Our logic and language
structures use principles that are related to experiential perceptual
structures.
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Embodied schemata give rise to pattern structure in all layers
of meaning (i.e. help structure all thought) through what Johnson
refers to as 'metaphorical projection.' Traditional conceptions of
metaphor have characterized it as a minor form of expression and a
non-essential literary figure of speech, but in recent years research in
many fields have gravitated to metaphor. Johnson believes that
metaphor is cognitively fundamental to our understanding, and is
rooted in non-propositional structures of thought. Metaphor is a
structure of transference that crosses categorical boundaries: "a
process by which we understand and structure one domain of
experience in terms of another domain of a different kind."2 7
Metaphor, he says, carries a significant creative and constitutive
burden in our thought. The body provides a place to derive
metaphorical structure through embodied image schemata--a source
domain--in order to help organize rational and propositional thought
through metaphorical projection. Though these patterns exist (for us)
pre-linguistically, "they can be considerably refined and elaborated
as a result of the acquisition of language and the conceptual systems
that language makes possible."2 8 What begins to emerge from
Johnson's concepts of image schemata and metaphorical projection is
a stratification of knowledge through layers of meaning. Meaning
goes deeper than conceptual understanding; conceptual and
propositional meaning is built upon non-propositional meaning
structures that emerge out of kinesthetic experience. Image schemata
cross the boundaries between non-propositional and propositional
layers to provide order and connectedness to our perceptions and
conceptions. Johnson identifies two possible features of a source
domain which may be metaphorically transferred to the source
domain: attributes and structural relations.2 9 As an example,
Johnson explores the 'path' schema and its possible projections into
language. All paths have three parts: a source or starting point, a
goal or endpoint, and a sequence of points connecting them. Thus,
these parts and their relationships indicate certain typical
27Ibid., p. 15.
28Ibid., p. 48.
2 9 Ibid., p. 109-110.
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characteristics for our path schema. 1) In moving from point A to
point B you must pass through every point in between; 2) In our
experience arises a certain directionality, even though paths are not
inherently directional; and 3) here is a temporal dimension that arises
in the movement from point A to point B. The internal structure for
the 'path' schema grounds a number of metaphorical projections from
concrete, physical source domain onto more abstract target domains,
such as the metaphor 'purposes are physical goals.' "Here goals are
understood as end points toward which my various physical actions
can be directed. In the metaphor we are understanding very abstract
purposes (such as writing a book, getting a Ph.D., finding happiness)
in terms of the performance of various physical acts in reaching a
spatial goal." If we conceive of 'states of being' metaphorically as
locations,' the mapping of the schematic structures (from the
concrete physical achievement of a goal onto the abstract domain of
achieving a purpose), a range of linguistic instantiations arises.
Purposes are Physical Goals: Tom has gone a long way toward
changing his personality. You have reached the midpoint of your
flight training. I've got quite a way to go before I get my Ph.D. she'sjust starting out to make her fortune. Jane was sidetracked in her
search for self-understanding. Follow me--this is the path to genuine
happiness. You'll never achieve salvation unless you change your
30bid., p. 113-115. course.30
There is a basic structural correlation between our physical
experience and our abstract purposes in daily life. In this way, we
can begin to see how embodied schemata begin to define a range of
possible meaning structures. It would be difficult, for instance, to
conceive of the metaphor "purposes are forms of containment"
because the internal, schematic structure of 'purpose' and
'containment' do not coincide. Likewise, there is an obvious limit to
our range of possible embodied experience. We are not quadrapedal,
we cannot fly: if we could our experience of the world and the world
we would build would be considerably different.
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Now
To say that image schemata 'constrain' our meaning and
understanding and that metaphorical systems 'constrain' our
reasoning is to say that they establish a range of possible patterns of
understanding and reasoning. They are like channels in which
something can move with a certain limited, relative freedom. Some
movements (inferences) are not possible at all. They are ruled out by
the image schemata and metaphors. But within these limits, there is
a measure of freedom or variability that is heavily context-
dependent Which inferences are sanctioned will depend, as we have
seen, on the metaphorically organized background against which
phenomena appear, questions are posed, investigations are
performed, and hypotheses are formulated. 3 1
The 'path' schema is of course just one possible schema of many. but
Johnson suggests there is a relatively limited number of schema that
are extensively pervasive within our meaning structures. To serve as
a source domain a schema should be pervasive in experience, well
understood because it is pervasive, well structured, simply structured,
emergent and well demarcated. 32
It is through imagination that we are able to organize mental
structures into meaningful systems, including the ability to
metaphorically project image schemata from one domain to another.
Johnson extends the function of imagination beyond conventional
associations of artistic creativity, invention or novelty, and the
resulting dichotomy between reason and imagination that has come
to dominate Western thinking. Instead, he argues that imagination is
a significant part of rationality. Drawing on Kant, Johnson derives a
theory which places imagination in a central and pivotal position
within all understanding. Instead of a conception of imagination as
irrational (a result of the fact that there does not seem to be any logic
to creativity) he proposes that imagination pervades and structures
all thought. "Once we no longer demand a disembodied rationality
(as we have seen evidenced in image schemata and metaphorical
projection), then there is no particular reason to exclude embodied
imagination from the bounds of reason." Imagination is the way we
manipulate those schemata and relational structures that are
fundamental to our understanding at all levels in order to make
3 1Ibid., p. 137.
32Here is a partial list,
according to Johnson, of
common schemata (Ibid., p.
126.):
container balance
blockage counterforce
enablement attraction
path link
cycle near-far
part-whole merging
full-empty matching
iteration contact
center-periphery mass-count
surface compulsion
superimposition process
object collection.
splitting scale
restraint removal
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connections for meaning. Imaginative creativity is a function of how
we metaphorically extend, reorganize and connect schemata in new
ways, and this "occurs at all levels of our experiential organization,
and not just in those rare moment when we discover novel ideas. We
are imaginatively creative every time we recognize a schema in a
new situation we have never experienced before and every time we
make metaphorical connections among various pre-conceptual and
conceptual structures." 3 3 Johnson suggests that an adequate theory
of imagination would include prototypical categorization, schemata,
metaphorical projections, metonymy (another form of projection),
and an understanding of the narrative structure of all experience.
Ultimately, meaning is inextricably tied up with understanding, and
understanding arises within the systems that structure imagination.
Human understanding constitutes our experience of a world that we
can make sense of, based on a cognitive model of structures,
extensions, transformations and relations. Because schemata emerge
in embodied experience, the integral relationship between body and
mind, and body and meaning, becomes clearer.
This particular formation of the relevant notion of understanding, as
a way of 'being in' or having a world, highlights the dynamic
interactive character of understanding and meaning. Grasping a
meaning is an event of understanding. Meaning is not merely a fixed
relation between sentences and objective reality, as Objectivism
would have it. What we typically regard as fixed meanings are
merely sedimented or stabilized structures that emerge as recurring
patterns in our understanding. 34
Johnson's exploration leads him to question the methods we
utilize to organize our knowledge: "Are embodied image schemata
and metaphorical systems of understanding sufficiently shared to be
considered relevant to knowledge, or are they too subjective,
unstructured, and unconstrained?" 35 He acknowledges those who
would argue that to conflate reason with imagination can only lead to
relativism. But rather than falling into the standard dichotomy of a
fixed and value-neutral rationality as opposed to anything goes
relativism, Johnson suggests that the depth of embodied
New Embodied Understanding
understanding offers a middle ground between foundationalism and
relativism. He posits a new objectivity where authority shifts from
fully propositional logic structures to account for this developed
understanding of our own mental activity. There are three key
notions to this new objectivist approach: understanding, imagination
and embodiment. He argues that objective characteristics come out
of our collective way of perceiving and understanding the
environment, and that subjectivity has less to do with the way we
perceive our environment and more to do with the interpretations and
experiences we bring to these perceptions. Truth is always relative
to our understanding, but as Johnson has demonstrated, our
understanding is in many respects commonly embodied. An
adequate theory of objectivity must make room for the role of human
experience and its position within our understanding. Shared
understanding is more than shared concepts and propositions, it also
includes and is partly structured by embodied structures of
understanding. 36 Thus, experience and understanding, broadly
conceived to include culture, language, theories, as well as physical
experience all partake of the reality of our bodies and our contextual
interaction.
Objectivity consists, then, in taking up an appropriate publicly shared
understanding or point of view. This involves rising above our
personal prejudices, idiosyncratic views, and subjective
representations. On the account I have sketched, objectivity is thus
made possible by the public nature of image-schematic and basic-
level structures of understanding, and the metaphoric and metonymic
projections based upon them. Objectivity does not require taking up
God's perspective, which is impossible; rather, it requires taking up
appropriately shared human perspectives that are tied to reality
through our embodied imaginative understanding. 3 7
Johnson's position of embodied understanding points to a
'pre-consciousness': a space of thought where we register experience
prior to positing it. Maurice Merleau-Ponty arrived at a similar
conclusion but with a greater emphasis on the implications of
perception and movement on our non-propositional understanding
36For the parameters of
Johnson's new objectivity, see p.
206-211.
37Ibid., p. 212.
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4 0Jbid., p. 213.
4Ijbid., p. x.
4 2At this point it is important to
point out the distinction
between Merleau-Ponty's
interpretation of
phenomenology, which attempts
to reveal underlying causes of
and experience of space. In the Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty searches for the essence of perception and the essence
of consciousness. He is more concerned with what makes experience
possible than he is with trying to discover what it is. It is a study of
the "advent of being to consciousness, instead of presuming its
possibility as given in advance." 3 8 The search for essence is not a
search for an idea defined by discourse, but for the very way in
which we access the world. To accomplish this investigation of
perception he looks to phenomenology, as phenomenology seeks the
essential in existence. He rejects a strict empiricism which by its
very method of inquiry assumes a conscious awareness of all
perception. Phenomenology "is the search for a philosophy which
shall be a rigorous science, but ... also offers an account of space,
time and the world we live in." (vii) Phenomenology brings together
the extremes of objectivism and subjectivism, and attempts to derive
a rationality based on the overlap and confirmation of perceptions.
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the split between objectivism and
subjectivism is more a function of the mode of thought we are in: the
core of consciousness lies in the subjective spontaneity of
experiencing something firsthand, and in the objective sedimentation
of knowledge that occurs in the reflection upon it after the fact.39
Each is a mode of consciousness. But as Merleau-Ponty cautions, his
theory "must not merely put one view of the world in place of
another, it must show us how the naive view of the world is included
and transcended by the sophisticated one."40 The unfinished nature
of phenomenology is inevitable, he notes, because "phenomenology's
task (is) to reveal the mystery of the world and of reason"4 1 through
analysis, but it gives almost no explicit indication of a productive
methodology for the manipulation and implementation of that which
it reveals.42
The comprehensible unity of our experience is not a formal
unity, but a form of perceptual organization. Although the senses are
distinct from each other, "in so far as each one of them brings with it
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a structure of being which can never be exactly transposed,"4 3
perception is mediated by a natural organization that interconnects
the senses to provide a cohesive unity of experience. Merleau-Ponty
argues, as Gibson does, that the senses overlap and integrate with
one another as part of a total perception.
It is true that the senses should not be put on the same basis, as if
they were all equally capable of objectivity and accessible to
intentionality. Experience does not present them to us as equivalent:
I think that visual experience is truer than tactile experience, that it
garners within itself its own truth and adds to it; because its richer
structure offers me modalities of being unsuspected by touch. The
unity of the senses is achieved transversally, according to their own
structure. But something like it is found in binocular vision, if it is
true that we have a 'directing eye' which bri"'- the other under its
control. These two facts--the taking over of sensory experiences in
general in visual experience, and that of the functions of one eye by
the other--prove that the unity of experience is not a formal unity, but
a primary organization.44
In our analysis we are capable of breaking perception into it:
constituent parts, but in experience this is typically not the case;
there is something foundational beneath our understanding of the
senses that unites them. Like Gibson and Johnson, Merleau-Ponty
argues that perception goes through a simplification or (as Johnson
would describe it) a schematization process for comprehensibility as
a part of its natural structure. We are capable of perceiving
something without knowing all of its constituent parts: perception
constructs understanding from the determinant qualities of our
perceptual range, and in this construction perception purges objects
of their ambiguity and infinite detail, and thus offers up the pure
ideal rather than the intricacy of reality. All experiences tend
towards a generality. A form of 'natural judgement' or affective
appraisal takes place within this schematization process of
perception. Rather than judgement considered solely as a reflective,
explanatory principle, Merleau-Ponty sees it as a constitutive
function of pre-conscious perception. "Perception would be a
judgement, which ... is unaware of the reasons underlying its own
experience, and that of most
phenomenological discourse in
architecture which tends to be
satisfied with descriptive
explanations of what our
experience is.
4 3Merleau-Ponty, p. 225.
44Ibid.,fromfootnote on p. 234.
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formation, which amounts to saying that the perceived object
presents itself as a totality and a unity before we have apprehended
the intelligible law governing it..." 4 5 By giving us a perspective, or
framework from which to interact with the world that is unique to
each of us, natural judgement brings unity to our world. We find a
parallel to natural judgement in Johnson's concept of 'embodied
understanding,' in which both attempt a resolution of pure perception
and the experience which we bring to it. Thus we find Merleau-
Ponty indicating the existence of a 'non-positing consciousness' to
structure our understanding of experience, distinct from intellectual
consciousness. This non-positing or pre-consciousness is a pre-
objective mental space that structures our understanding of
experience: from organizing our relative perceptions in terms of
adjacent and successive order, 4 6 to the integration of the separate
sense modalities, schematization for easier comprehension of our
complex environment, and the resolution of our pure perception and
our experience in terms of affective appraisal.
The perception of our own body and the perception of external things
provide an example of non-positing consciousness, that is, of
consciousness not in possession of fully determinate objects, that of a
logic lived through which cannot account for itself, and that of an
immanent meaning which is not clear to itself and becomes fully
aware of itself only through experiencing certain natural signs. (The
meaning in our pre-consciousness is not explicit, nor can it be so.)
These phenomena cannot be assimilated by objective thought... 4 7
Within the realm of the pre-consciousness, sense and significance are
not even theoretically separable. It is, as phenomenology describes
it, our being-in-the-world.
This pre-consciousness is where the physicality of our bodies
interacts with the mental structures that account for them. Merleau-
Ponty posits two types of connections between the psychic and
physiological: one in terms of the perceptual and sensual body, the
other in terms of bodily space-time. Merleau-Ponty looks at certain
medical phenomena where, for example, a patient who has lost a
limb experiences or senses a'phantom limb' as if that appendage was
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still present. But when nerves are severed that would normally
transfer information from the limb to the brain, the 'phantom'
disappears. The phantom therefore cannot be a product of the
subconscious, or of imagination, and yet there is no fully physical
explanation available. "What has to be understood, then, is how the
psychic determining factors and the physiological conditions gear
into each other."4 8 Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the difficulty in
discovering some sort of common ground to these two, one which
exists in space and the other which exists only in our consciousness,
in order that they may bring about the resultant phenomenon. He
suggests that memory is key: "the imaginary arm is then, like
repressed experience (an abstraction out of a previous experience) a
former present which cannot decide to recede into the past. The
memories called up before the patient induce in him a phantom limb,
not as an image in associationism summons up another image, but
because any memory reopens time lost to us and invites us to
recapture the situation evoked."4 9 But Merleau-Ponty's analysis
seems incomplete, and might have been more satisfactory had he had
knowledge of Johnson's theory of embodied understanding.
Embodied understanding suggests that we have abstract patterns of
thought pre-existing in the pre-consciousness, anticipating, with a
certain preparedness, the action of the limb. Memory recalls the arm
into consciousness, and the mind searches for those existing schema
necessary to process the memory and discover an'image' of it. The
schema which were designed to implement or respond to some action
by the limb react to the memory, creating the phantom. This
scenario suggests that the pre-consciousness is tied into memory and
tied into the biological body through the nervous system in some
fundamental way.
The other psycho-physical connection is not internally, but
externally generated, in the spatiality created by the movement of the
body. Merleau-Ponty considers how movement implicates our
experience and our conception of space: "By considering the body in
4 8 Ibid., p. 77.
4 9 Ibid., p. 85.
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movement, we can see better how it inhabits space (and, moreover,
time) because movement is not limited to submitting passively to
space and time, it actively assumes them, it takes them up in their
basic significance which is obscured in the commonplaceness of
established situations." 5 0 The connection between body and space is
reinforced by perception, which (as Gibson demonstrated) pre-
supposes movement of the body for the apprehension of information.
Depth perception, for instance, is a function of movement and
experience and cannot be comprehended by vision alone. Likewise,
the haptic and basic-orientation senses require a motor experience.
The continually changing perceptions of kinesthesis form our
primary understanding of space; bodily movement is our
fundamental way of access to the world. Thus we come to see a
certain 'spatiality of the senses,' as the senses are determined by
movement. The body is a spatiality of situation, not a spatiality of
position as are external objects; 'situation' pre-supposes an
interaction between body and background primarily mediated
through movement. The background is not merely externally linked
to movement, but rather it "is immanent in the movement, inspiring
and sustaining it at every moment."5 1 Our movement is as much a
function of the space that contains us as it is of our own actions; we
engage in movement which is not unrelated to our backgrounds, but
which on the contrary, bears a highly determinate relation to them.
He thus argues that movement and background are artificial divisions
of a unified totality. Movement is the primary way by which we
form relationships to space. If movement is necessary for
perception, and if our perceptual embodiment organizes our
understanding, then our very existence is spatial.52
Another approach to deriving new forms of objectivity based
on movement and embodied understanding and their consequences
on human existence and knowledge can be found in the work of John
Schumacher. Along the path of development to the modem world,
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he argues, man severed the connection between himself and the
world by removing the dynamics of time. We are no longer'loosely'
connected with the world as we once were because the tendency is to
consider everything separate from time. We no longer refer
ourselves to the existing world, but rather, refer the world to
ourselves in an abstract instantaneous moment. Schumacher argues
that movement is fundamental to returning time and the body back
into philosophical discourse and back to their privileged positions
within our experience. Architecture, he says, ought to be designed
"in a space that is not separate from time, so that built environments
can be realized only through the movement of the people who use
them."5 3 For Schumacher it is a reconsideration of the terms of
human posture--the way we make a place in the world relative to our
own bodies and to that which surrounds us. "Through its posture a
thing and that which stands around it are bound together."54 His
goal is edification, and ultimately to expand the possibilities within
which we live our lives. He suggests that we can devise a new sense
of intellectual objectivity through the "co-making" of inquiry: a co-
making between ourselves and the world.
Our posture, the way we place ourselves in relation to, and
form relationships with the world is fundamental to the way we
experience, create and analyze that world.
How basic is posture? Well how indeed can a thing be in the world
unless it makes a place there? To be in the world is to have a
posture. Think for a moment about the different things in the world
and the way they make places there. Each thing will have parts or
features that are placed relative to each other in a certain order.
Some relative placings are necessary, some are not, and of the latter,
some are possible and some are not. Let us say, each thing has both
a characteristic posture that distinguishes it from other kinds of
things and a range of possible, optional postures that may also
distinguish it from others of its own kind.5 5
Our posture is a function inherently of our physical being, and
optionally of our orientation; and our orientation can take one of two
positions: absolute or relative. Schumacher attempts to give this
distinction clarity in the dichotomy of being 'free' versus being 'loose'
53Schanacher, John,
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from the world. Rather than accepting Merleau-Ponty's claim that
body and background exist in a unique totality, he argues that we
have a certain 'looseness' or flexibility in our connection with our
world. He notes that bees, for instance, are loose from their world,
but cannot be free of it--they cannot be separated from sunlight
without disorientation; the bee and sunlight/world co-make the bee's
opportunity to find food. Modem humanity, however, has gradually
advanced on freeing itself from connection with the physical world,
and into the realm of abstract objectivity, which can only constrain
our realm of experience. "It was this (modem human) posture that
gradually seduced us to abandon joint movement as a way of life,
and instead to dance to the rhythm of our readings in
society...Inquiry in the modem human posture, though responsible
for many advantages of our current way of life that we cannot afford
to lose, does not make co-making evident."5 6 This 'freeing' from our
environment ultimately points towards disorientation; and although
our making of places in the world will always reflect a certain
connection, "it need not reflect the extreme loosening of being
broken away from the world, inasmuch as our original posture speaks
of bound-togetherness, should we bother to listen to it. To be loose
in an order of co-making (between ourselves and the world) is not
the same as to be free in an order of making."57 To be free in this
sense is to fully constitute and construct (determine) one's own
world. Schumacher has faith in the capacity of the terms of posture,
as one discourse among many, to displace the conventional reliance
on the categories of the conscious mind mistakenly considered to
transcend the body.
Schumacher defines this postural distinction within the
dichotomy of the bodily-oriented 'standpoint' and the visually-
oriented 'point of view.' The standpoint, or what I will refer to as
'natural seeing' (footnote) is loosely tied to the world, whereas the
abstract viewpoint is attempting to break free of that connection. He
argues that we have lost any sense of our own sensuality--our own
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perceptual mechanisms that bring us in contact with the world--as we
have furthered intellectualism.
At a standpoint (natural seeing) I have no sense of spatial ubiquity, of
a place separate from time. I stand here, other things stand there, and
we are in touch through the ground, along which we must move to
close the distance between us. But at a point of view (abstract
viewing) I have a sense of spatial ubiquity, of a place separate from
time: other things are at a distance at once, through the air. I am, as
it were, swept off my feet into the space of the world in view, no
longer in touch with or through the ground; I have a sense, not of a
distance to be moved through, but rather of distance separate from
time.5 8
The dichotomy is a function of two methods of description--one
which is an order of movement of the space-time of natural seeing,
and another which is read in the abstract space of the viewpoint.
Essentially, the difference is that when we conceive of the world
through'natural seeing' time is a dependent variable, but in abstract
viewing time can only be an independent variable--it is not always
already a part of our discourse. We find a parallel in Merleau-
Ponty's division between concrete and abstract movement, which
represents the dichotomy of physiological versus psychic
consciousness. "This distinction can survive," Merleau-Ponty
argues, "only if there are several ways for consciousness to be
consciousness." 5 9 Schumacher reveals the connection in space-time
that the Hopi Indians in the southwestern United States have with
their world. The Hopi language is incapable of expressing spatiality
without a relationship to time; the element of time is not even
theoretically separable from elements of space. So when they
consider distance, it is inextricably tied to the movement of the body
in space-time. "The Hopi are 'frankly pragmatic': distance is a matter
of human effort, referring us to the action required to span it."6 As
Merleau-Ponty noted, distance, or depth perception in natural seeing,
is a function of movement and experience. Schumacher indicates
that many of our own words that are today spatially oriented
developed from a dynamic language base, much the way the Hopi
language is structured. Schumacher, like Johnson, is bringing the
58IMd., p. 64.
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body back into the mind, but from a different intentionality.
Whereas Johnson revealed structures of language as being
fundamentally embodied, Schumacher notes their roots in space-
time. Although the abstract, objective viewpoint is part of our
essence (as a function of human mental capability), the cognitive
mapping that it accomplishes cannot completely account for our
physical and sensual interaction with those things that surround us, as
natural seeing more accurately can.
A conception of our world constituted through movement
pulls the mind and body together and invokes sensuality back into
our lives, specifically because movement is so fundamental to our
existence. As we have seen, the observer in motion (not the
motionless observer) comes closest to objectivity; in eliminating the
necessity of conscious memory for successive order, Gibson
articulated the dynamic nature of perception, and likened it to being
everywhere at once and all-seeing. Thus our knowledge of an object
comes from successive experience and our ability to comprehend in
an order of movement. Movement allows us to 'read' and 'be read' in
a number of ways; but without it we only become alienated as
constructed and constrained human beings.
Schumacher believes that the structuring of modem society
around abstract viewpoints has minimized the significance of
sensuality in the Western world. Beginning with Descartes and
Newton, "philosophy and eventually science were captivated by an
outside-in orientation" 6 1 to the body-world continuity, and its
capacity to subvert relativity. To explore the system of reality from
within the system is inherently limited; it is difficult to reveal that
which one adheres to. Thus, the objectivity of abstract viewing grew
more prominent. The outside-in analysis of the objective viewpoint
led to efficiency in readability, and has thus produced a society
organized around what Foucault describes as the 'panopticon' of the
power structure. (power and knowl) The panopticon represents our
experience of living within the viewpoints of the inspection
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principle; from the order of our children's classrooms to the watchful
eye of security cameras, we have structured our lives in favor of
visual surveillance and the constriction of movement. This has
ultimately produced a society of people where the individuals assume
the roles of both the inspector and the inspected. Quoting Foucault,
Schumacher argues: "He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and
who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he
makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself
the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he
becomes the principle of his own subjection." 62 Thus we make a
place in the world as if we were under inspection and thereby
eliminate sensuality, limiting the possibilities of the way we live our
lives.
It is through the sensuality of movement, Schumacher
argues, that we can pull people together onto the common ground of
a new objectivity. "I am urging a new sense of objectivity...
grounded in an order of co-making with reality." Our method of
entry into this new analysis takes two forms. The first is our shared
way of orienting to the world in the sensuality of posture. The
movement inherent in natural seeing brings the world into a dialogue
with our bodies, and in that movement we discover certain invariants
common to all of us. In space-time, views have no true objectivity,
whereas the movement image approximates objectivity in the ability
to 'see' from all points. Therefore, places should be seen as aspects
of movements in the world. 63 Above and beyond the
phenomenological and nostalgic 'place' making that pervades much
of our architectural discourse, the introduction of time makes place
an event more than a location--more a function of human activity--
and thus more oriented to the reception of information through
movement. The second key to this new form of objectivity builds on
these commonalities of experience to build up circles of consensus
through empirical comparison. Much as our senses overlap and
confirm one another, we have the common ground to approach and
62Ibid., p. 175.
63 bidP., p. 146.
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confirm objectivity in our co-making with other people. Rather than
the abstract absolutes of objectivity based on viewpoints, we can
direct ourselves using shared commonalities of embodiment to
ground our analysis.
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After 1980, when it was evident that architecture was
devolving into visually-oriented, surface representations, a
growing challenge to the inability of mainstream post modernism
to cope with the problems of modernity emerged, originating
from several camps. One such reaction could be found in the
writings of Kenneth Frampton. Frampton is one of the few
established architectural critics who has attempted to impact the
direction of architecture through an operative, rather than simply
a critical theory: a theory that attempts to affect, not just explain.
In his 1983 essay "Towards a Critical Regionalism: Six Points for
an Architecture of Resistance," Frampton lays out a polemical
position based in the resistance to the continual envelopment of
culture through the universal consumption of the media industry.
He argues that a contemporary critical practice can only arise in
the resolution of the instrumental reason of modem civilization
and the collective psycho-social reality of cultural expression:
"the fundamental strategy of Critical Regionalism is to mediate
the impact of universal civilization with elements derived
indirectly from the peculiarities of a particular place."i
Frampton makes explicit the distinction between his position and
that of other contemporary trends:
It is necessary...to distinguish between Critical Regionalism and
simple-minded attempts to revive the hypothetical forms of a lost
vernacular. In contradistinction to Critical Regionalism, the
primary vehicle of Populism is the communicative or instrumental
sign. Such a sign seeks to evoke not a critical perception of
reality, but rather the sublimation of a desire for direct experience
through the provision of information. Its tactical aim is to attain,
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as economically as possible, a preconceived level of gratification
in behavioristic terms.2
Financial concerns have driven society towards a need for
immediate aesthetic satisfaction through the aura of complete and
self-contained instants. He warns against the misperceived aura of
kitsch, and the ability of the mass media to mold architecture into
a meaningless simulacra.3 On the other hand, an architecture of
resistance necessitates a critical self-consciousness--an awareness
of humanity's labile relationship between place and modem
technology.
Modem tendencies since World War 11 have been to shift
our urban emphasis to increasingly larger scales, expanding the
separation between urban issues and human existence. And the
domination of economic concerns has made it increasingly
difficult to define a coherent urban form. Modernity has thus
produced a continuum of placelessness. As part of an architecture
resistant to such effects of modernity, Frampton proposes an
approach to architecture that includes an emphasis on the tactile
and experiential. Frampton turns to Heidegger for strategies to
overcome the overwhelming absence of connection with the
world. "...We shall now try to clarify the essence of these things
that we call buildings by the following brief consideration. For
one thing, what is the relation between location and space? For
another, what is the relation between man and space?" 4 Dwelling,
Heidegger answers, is the fundamental character of the way we are
here on earth. Heidegger goes on to state that "the condition of
'dwelling' and hence ultimately of 'being' can only take place in a
domain that is clearly bounded." 5 The "place-form," as Frampton
describes this bounded domain, carries a burden within both
institutional and physical form. The institutional place-form can
be seen in concepts of community and social interaction. More
significant to this study, however, is the physicality and tactility of
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the bounded domain. The tactile's role in the constitution of a
complex architectural environment has been overlooked in favor
of vision: "the tactile resilience of the place-form and the capacity
of the body to read the environment in terms other than those of
sight alone suggest a potential strategy for resisting the
domination of universal technology. It is symptomatic of the
priority given to sight that we find it necessary to remind ourselves
that the tactile is an important dimension on the perception of
built form." 6 Frampton describes an experience through Alvar
Aalto's Sayynatsalo Town Hall (1952) where the architectural
expression occurs as much through the tactile as the visual. The
contrast between brick and wood underfoot, in terms of surface
texture, friction, deflection and sound reverberation, evolves an
understanding of the relationship between two consecutive spaces.
By exploiting the tactile, the body is brought to terms with the
reality of the presence of the place-form; the place-form must be
felt as much as seen.
...It is clear that the liberative importance of the tactile resides in
the fact that it can only be decoded in terms of experience itself: it
cannot be reduced to mere information, to representation or to the
simple evocation of a simulacrum substituting for absent
presences.
In this way, Critical Regionalism seeks to complement our
normative visual experience by readdressing the tactile range of
human perceptions. In so doing, it endeavors to balance the
priority accorded to the image and to counter the western
tendency to interpret the environment in exclusively perspective
terms...the tactile opposes itself to the scenographic and the
drawing of veils over the surface of reality. Its capacity to arouse
the impulse of touch returns the architect to the poetics of
construction, (Hence Frampton's emphasis on the tectonic) and to
the erection of works in which the tectonic value of each
component depends upon the density of its objecthood. 7
Frampton has suggested that we turn to the writing and
research of Scott Gartner to reveal further options in the creation
of a work of resistance. Gartner is one of the few, (if not the only)
architects to make explicit derivations from the work of Mark
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Johnson. Like Frampton, he believes that architectural theory has
promoted vision and language to assume an over-privileged
position; but unlike Frampton, Gartner's criticism is more
contained within the profession itself. Theories that consider
architecture as an entirely conceptual phenomenon have
overlooked the fundamental tenet that it is through the experience
of the body
...that the mind is brought into meaningful relationship with the
world...Experience, as it relates to understanding, seems reduced
to a matter of the visual registration of coded messages--a
function of the eye which might as well rely on the printed page
and dispense with the physical presence of architecture altogether.
The body, if it figures into architectural theory at all, is often
reduced to an aggregate of needs and constraints which are to be
accommodated by methods of design grounded in behavioral and
ergonomic analysis. Within this framework of thought, the body
and its experience do not participate in the constitution or
realization of architectural meaning. 8
He acknowledges that although signification and reference play a
role in the construction of meaning, he believes that too much
emphasis is given to the cognitive realm of architectural meaning.
This, he argues, is a function of the Objectivist split of mind and
body; Objectivism attempts to create a perspective outside the
tangible world. "From this perspective, there is a permanent
division between cognition and reason on the one side and
perception, emotion and imagination on the other."9 Whereas
Objectivist theories consider language as a "transparent analog of
reality," Gartner and Johnson argue that linguistic understanding
is just a special instance of general understanding.
In opposition to those contemporary theories of
architecture that equate meaning with 'signification', he proposes
that the work of architecture should be considered as embodying
meaning within itself first, before referencing other things. As
Frampton has explained, architecture should not be considered as
standing for an "absence", but thought of as a "presence."
Gartner looks to the eighteenth century philosopher Giambattista
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Vico to help explicate an architecture that embodies meaning
within. In order to reveal the true relationship of body and mind,
Vico felt it necessary to leave aside the abstract terms and
relationships which form the basis of our own thought and
consider the minds of the first people. Like Johnson, Vico
identified metaphor as fundamental to the earliest human thought.
"Because the minds of these first people were 'buried on the
body' the basis of their metaphorical thought must have been the
body and its interaction with the world, the only common medium
which their imaginations could have flourished. Vico termed this
fully embodied thought a 'corporeal imagination."' 10 Their
minds were saturated with the senses. Through metaphorical
projection, the 'corporeal imagination' was the only possible way
of transferring mental structure from the realm of experience to
the realm of ideas. Conventional perceptions of metaphor define
it as a minor element of language. Quoting Johnson and George
Lakoff, Gartner explains: "Metaphor is not merely a matter of
language. It is a matter of conceptual structure. And conceptual
structure is not merely a matter of the intellect--it involves all the
natural dimensions of our sense experience: color, shape, texture,
sound, etc. These dimensions structure not only mundane
experience, but aesthetic experience as well."l 1 The range of
conceptual structures substantially consists of ontological and
orientational metaphors. Ontological metaphors are composed of
organizational systems derived from bodily experience. Our
world consists of elements which can be distinguished, grouped,
and qualified through our conceptual understanding of the
relationship between inside and outside--a relationship which, in
turn, produces bounded definitions. Orientational metaphors
relate our physical being to the world through relationships such
as up and down, front and back, right and left, and near and far.
These metaphors structure and define physiological space, and
each dimension, unlike the three dimensions of metric space, is
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loaded with a distinctive value. These metaphors are all part of
our system of perceiving and understanding our environment "in
terms of repeating and consistent patterns of events and
relationships;" 12 or as Johnson describes them, schemata. A true
understanding of architecture, therefore, depends on our ability to
grasp the metaphorical dimension, the fundamental conceptual
schemata of the work. We approach new buildings with an
understanding of patterns acquired through previous experience.
"..No matter how new the particular form produced chances are
that people will have learned responses that will enable them to
deal with the building, or that they will be able to develop them. 13
He claims that architecture is not simply a representation, but also
a presentation of meaning--that it embodies meaning within
itself."This...is the most important sense in which buildings are
meaningful; not as channels of communication for a set of
intended meanings, nor as signs for ideas but as buildings. Our
understanding of architecture is thus a way of experiencing the
work itself as meaningful." 1 4
As Johnson has shown (see chapter one) the transfer of
conceptual schemata from one domain of experience to another
can only take place through an act of imagination. It is through
imaginative metaphorical projections that our bodily experience is
expanded into the cognitive and therefore cultural realm. But the
fundamentally embodied nature of imagination constrains our
understanding in certain ways. Therefore, metaphor is open to
analysis (even though its meaning cannot be reduced to a literal
set of propositions). Gartner's theory for architecture is unique
because of his insightful understanding of the complex and
integrated relationship between meaning at a bodily and at a
cognitive level: "Because our understanding of the world is
constituted by an interlocking network of metaphorical
projections of one domain of experience onto another, the
meaning of a statement, an event or an object can be thought of as
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a resonance with the world." 15 Rather than seeing a
juxtaposition of the multiple layers of meaning, Gartner argues
that the underlying conceptual structures permeate and relate the
multiple layers of meaning. As an example, beyond the schema
of 'strength' that might arise in our perception of a Doric
column, we can transfer this schemata of 'strength' through
metaphorical projection to the conception of a masculine body,
thus relating the Doric column and the male figure. But note that
this is not a direct association (where the interpretation of
'masculine' within the Doric might require prior knowledge of all
of the orders), but a relation through a common schema
underlying both.
Although there is a certain accuracy in Gartner's
assessment of possible relationships between embodied and
cognitive meanings, he does not respond to the discrepancy that
arises between this analysis and the design process. Because he
sees architecture itself is a medium of thought, Gartner argues that
the designer can create through embodied thought, and that
meaning arises and evolves in the process. "In that what
architecture expresses is embodied in the work, and that what is
understood is the meaningfulness of the work itself, we must
acknowledge a certain inseparability of form from content." 16
He is suggesting that architectural ideas are understood as
architecture. "The primary expression of meaning in architecture
should not, therefore, be thought of as a 'translation' of concepts
into a material 'language' of form." 17 But such a position
unwittingly places equal emphasis and value on all conceptual
schemata, and provides no guidance as to how they should be
utilized. The result is a 'flattening' or leveling of meaning, in that
all schemata are treated as equivalencies. Further, the example
used above of the schema of 'strength' would be equally
meaningful wherever implemented, and regardless of its
relationship to its context. To deny that architecture is a
15 Ibid., p. 6.
1 1bid., p. 10.
17bd., p. 2.
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'translation of concepts' is to deny the design process itself: a
process where an architect will have those values he wishes to
emphasize, based on his conceptual understanding of the
particular project. This analysis of meaning as a function of
embodied reception is significant, but in its translation into a
productive system it fails to address or engage methods of design
implementation.
Another response to the inadequacies of post modernism's
inability to grapple with the question of meaning in architecture
can be found in the writings of Karsten Harries. Harries reacted
against and responded to two primary discourses of the new
architecture: the privileging of language and the resulting
conventional historicism. He argues that the architect not only
needs to question the privileging of the word, but more
importantly resist the contemporary infusion of language as an
opposition to space. The language problem is almost exclusively
a twentieth century phenomenon that arose in the wake of the
ascendance of the modernist aesthetic. Quoting Tafuri, Harries
argues: "The emergence within architectural criticism, of the
language problem, is a precise answer to the language crisis of
modem architecture." 18 The language crisis, Harries argues, is
inseparable from the problems that arose out of the new
technology. As an example, technology is a major factor in the
diminishing importance of distance in modem society, and
therefore of body. The postmodem pre-occupation has been with
this language crisis, and with potential ways of overcoming it,
through signs, conventions and myths: often arriving in the form
of historicism. Historicist architecture, once divorced from its
context, no longer speaks with conviction about an evolving ideal
image of humanity; "...such a turn to the past seemed the cynical
attempt of a rational age to cover up its own poverty." 19 On the
other hand, any sense of belonging, of continuum with the past
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has virtually disappeared, leaving modem man to fend for himself
in the endless continuum of space-time. In the U.S., this absent
grounding is perhaps no more evident than in the growing search
for ethnic and cultural distinctions. How, Harries asks, can
architecture cope with this absence?
Harries' philosophical approach to dealing with this
language problem in architecture is grounded in an ethical
position: an idealistic search for the non-arbitrary in the built
environment. "Aesthetic sensibilities," he says, "carry ethical
implications." 2 0 Modernism had freed man from the constraints
of culture; but with such freedom came the arbitrary. "If there is
one characteristic that links the diverse art movements of the
modernist period, it is perhaps the hyper awareness of the fact that
our sensibility could have been other wise."2 1 In reaction to the
arbitrary and mute nature of modernism, mainstream post
modernism had sought the non-arbitrary primarily through
historical convention; but one of the difficulties of looking to the
past "is that history does not speak with one, but with many
voices." 2 2 The work of Robert Venturi, Harries suggests, reflects
the search for the lost voices of space, that is unfortunately
misdirected. While modernist architecture had emphasized the
articulation of space at the expense of communication, post
modernism was allowing signs to dominate space. Harries quest
for a non-arbitrary or binding reading of history turned to the
essential: the arbitrary could only be subverted through a
fundamental grounding of the relationship between man and the
world. "I have linked the problem of arbitrariness to our greater
freedom. To this one may object that freedom has here been
grasped inadequately, because only negatively: true freedom is
not freedom from constraint, but rather to be constrained only by
what one really is, by one's essence. This suggests that the
problem of arbitrariness might be met by returning to what is
essential."2 3 As Johnson identifies, our understanding is
20Ibid., p. 12.
21HUbbr, WiaM,
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fundamentally constrained by the range of possible image
schemata that can be derived from patterns of experience Ideals
are imagined constructions, inevitably altered by cultural
influence, but this does not mean that they are therefore arbitrary.
Architecture should represent architecture, and re-present the
essence of architecture; it should communicate what matters in
architecture--a particular ideal. Like Gartner, Harries perceives
architecture as having less to do with conscious and active
interpretation. Both argue that architecture must speak as
architecture before all else.
In an effort to help emphasize this ethical position, Harries
draws correlations to political theory. As the authority of nature
and reason began to supplant divine sanction as the legitimators of
our lives in the 17th and 18th centuries, the philosophy of social
relations began to take a new form. Likewise, architecture started
down a similar path: "The primitive hut (or what the primitive hut
represents) has played a part in architectural theory that parallels
that of the social contract in political theory. Whether there ever
was such a hut matters as little as whether there ever was such a
contract." 24 We live our lives in a social environment where
there is theoretically an essential way of relating to other people,
and our political system seems to continually evolve towards what
that essence is. In other words, the state of relations as defined by
the political system is progressively better today than they were
300 years ago , or even twenty-five years ago. Harries contends
that if nature and reason are to be given authority across our life
experiences, then it should also more fully invade the arbitrarium
of architecture. The search for the essential is a modem
phenomenon because the arbitrary nature of architecture has only
arisen within the context of modem man. "Region and history
help determine what we find natural and inevitable. But the less
an individual is bound to a particular place in space and time, the
weaker that determination, and the greater the uncertainty about
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what is to count as natural. This helps to explain why the problem
of the arbitrariness of architecture is characteristically modem.
We have greater difficulty constructing our ideal hut than Laugier
did." 2 5 The essential, Harries argues, should be revealed as
nature and reason pervade architecture.
So, in opposition to conventional historicism, Harries
appeals to a more "primordial understanding, less subject to the
prejudices of time."2 6 In order to discover those aspects of
architecture that are not subjected to time, he calls for an
archaeology of conventional symbols to reveal the natural
symbols buried beneath them. Like Schmarsow, Harries uses
space, not form or language as the fundamental component of
architecture. Any language of architecture must pre-suppose the
language of space "and that language is a natural, not a
conventional, language." 27 Concurrent with Johnson and
Gartner, the natural symbols of space compose a language
addressed first to sense and imagination, as opposed to symbols
that receive meaning in the conscious, standard reduction to the
visual relation of subject to object. Harries adopts Heidegger's
notion of 'being-in-the-world' in order to challenge the
confrontational nature of such reductions, where the relation of
subject to object is conceived of from a fixed point in time and
space. Our "being-in-the-world is misunderstood when we think
of it ... in terms of a subject facing a mute world of objects, which
the subject then has to (consciously) endow with meanings. The
understanding of the world as a collection of meaningless facts
rests on a distorting reduction of experience that must lose sight
of the significance of things."2 8 He introduces the concept of a
body matrix which places value on experience based on our
human physical relationship with our surroundings. Such a
matrix, like Gartner's orientational metaphors, partially consists of
bodily coordinates such as up/down, back/front, and left/right.
The body is seen as a "paradigmatic ruler" that determines the
25Ibid., p. 15.
2 6Ibid., p. 15.
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"initial disclosure of space," in terms of the meaning in bodily
experience. 2 9 Up carries a different meaning from down, based
on our bodily relation, prior to any personal value or conscious
association we might make with both. But these natural symbols
and conventional symbols are intertwined. The conventional
symbol builds upon the natural symbol of space. Where Gartner
had emphasized the connection of mind and body in our
understanding, Harries is more concerned with the stratification of
meaning and the way in which meaning must have evolved. In his
essay "Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture" of 1983, he
suggests that architectural academia could teach something akin to
a vocabulary of abstract natural symbols, acknowledging however
that it would not be sufficient substance for the creation of
buildings. In a later essay, he is more cautious: "this attempt to
found the language of space in the structure of being human in
the world may suggest that by carefully studying this structure we
should be able to develop something like a dictionary, perhaps
even a grammar of the language of space. Here, however, it is
important to keep in mind that the way we stand in the world is
inevitably concrete and our own, colored by personal experiences,
shaped by landscape and climate, shaped also by the community
to which we belong and by its' history." 3 0 Any consideration of
a vocabulary should make us wary and critical, because when we
assume certain forms as formulas we can tend to overlook the
realities of certain situations; but when thoughtfully considered as
a base or substratum for the development of architecture, the
vocabulary's potential effectiveness should become clear.
Underlying the Harries project is a profound historical
perspective on the human condition. One angle of his ethical
approach considers how this era might be perceived years from
now. Such self-knowledge arising from a consideration of our
development is, according to Foucault, a distinctly modem
phenomenon. As I have noted elsewhere, Foucault has
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demonstrated a stratification of knowledge, or ways of
understanding the world. Likewise, Harries' perspective upon
architecture reveals similar stratified structure where convention is
built upon nature. In conceiving the relationship between man
and environment, "meaning cannot...be made or invented, it can
only be discovered, where such a discovery will also be a self-
discovery." In our self-knowledge we have become too critical to
accept simply repeating the past through historicist architecture.
The choices we make communicate a particular ideal, and speaks
for our generation in the great scheme of things, and will be
looked upon years from now in an historical perspective as
representative of our moment. Such an ethical philosophy is a
continuation of a process that has been underway for some time.
"We are still not done with the Enlightenment, (and) that goes for
its architectural theory as well as for its political theory."3 1
From his historical perspective, Harries has prposed a set
of values that demonstrate the meaningfulness (for all of us) of
the body in relation to space. But where Harries' theory of
embodied architectural experience leaves off calling for a
vocabulary, Thomas Thiis-Evensen's work begins. Building upon
the work of Norberg-Schulz and Venturi, Thiis-Evensen describes
his vocabulary as a system of archetypes, pre-existing formal
entities that have specific impacts on those who engage them.
Archetypes are the original models after which other elements in
our built environment are patterned. "The present work," he
says, "is limited to the question of how the archetype affects us
psychologically." 3 2 He wants to replace the generally subjective
understandings architects have of form with a more accurate
account of the embodied experience of the built environment.
"In other words, behind the plurality of the many forms in
history lies a simple set of archetypes which we can call the
3 1 Hrries, "Thoughts on a Non-
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grammar of architecture." 3 3 Like Harries, he is concentrating on
the commonalities in architectural experience, but with very direct
design applications. David Seamon writes:
Thiis-Evensen argues that his work has direct design implications.
He claims that, too often, an architect's aesthetic sense is subjective
because he or she has not thoughtfully considered how
architectural forms arise from and translate themselves back into
shared, inescapable existential qualities...Thiis-Evensen believes
that understanding the archetypes and their 'expressive
potentialities is essential when (a design) vision is to be turned into
a realization. 3 4
This vocabulary arises out of the necessity to resolve the
dichotomy between what he perceives as the split between
rationality and subjectivity. "These two extremes...represent a
well known dilemma found in both architects' and users'
relationship to architecture. On the one hand, we have a need for
something stable and universal--a basis for prediction and
recognition--and on the other, the need for personal and
emotional recognition." 35 The archetypes become the stable and
rational springboard for the acknowledgment and development of
personal or cultural aspects of architecture. Thiis-Evensen
identifies private and social experiences as the two categories
constituting our most conscious relationship to how our
surroundings are experienced. He also suggests, however, that
there is a third level of experience alongside the private and social:
"This level, which is to a great extent independent of cultural
determinants, can be termed the universal level. These shared
experiences are difficult to put one's finger on because they
belong to our spontaneous and unconscious reactions to
architecture." 3 6 The commonalities in reception are directly
connected to the direct and immediate experience of the form
itself.
Archetypes in Architecture is a search for the emotional
content of architecture in a discussion of the common
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psychological impacts of the physical environment. The concept
of emotion as it has permeated architectural discourse tends to be
vague and intangible, and rarely productive. The broad definition
of emotion forces us to consider how do we are to discern our
love for our family separately from an affected response to the
built environment. This is an attempt to set a solid foundation and
understanding for the production of an architecture that addresses
emotional content. Psychologists tend to divide emotion into
long term traits or dispositions, and short term states. Such short-
term emotional content appears more relevant to Thiis-Evensn's
study (and indeed to all architectural discourse), and can be
divided into three categories: 1) affective appraisal --the
interpretation and judgment of other things, 2) mood--describes a
person's subjective state at any given moment, but is not a result of
anything in particular, and 3) emotional episode--a reaction to
some thing or event in particular, like getting angry at
someone.37 Thiis-Evensen's inquiry focuses on affective
appraisal, or what Merleau-Ponty described as natural judgement,
(though he does enter into the other two).
Thiis-Evensen argues that the universal expression of
architecture is a phenomenon of the dynamic interaction between
inside and outside space, and concentrates on these commonalities
of experience through an investigation of the space-defining
elements of wall, floor and roof. Like Frampton, he believes the
design of spatial boundaries implicate the spatial form and
identify a range of possible enclosure. The boundary provides
shelter, which Thiis-Evensen perceives as the essence of
architecture.
In other words, the elements of the roof, wall and floor all do the
same thing--they balance the forces of inside and outside. The
battle between these forces is an existential prerequisite for
mankind. Without shelter, in the broadest sense, man cannot live
upon this earth. In this context, these delimiting elements embody
a fundamental meaning and thereby a fundamental expressive
37Russel, J. and Snodgrass, J.
"Emotion and Environment" in
Handbook of Environmental
Psychology (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1987).
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potential, in that we evaluate them in relation to their principal role
of protecting an interior space from an exterior space. 3 8
Thus physical shelter and the range of possible enclosure is
considered as the driving force behind all works of architecture.
The archetypes are a function of these spatially defining elements
and the potential they have to elicit specific meanings, ultimately
directing the experience of the relationship between inside and
outside.
Thiis-Evensen suggests that there are three qualitative
concepts which can be used to explore the relative closure or
op:ness of the space-defining forms of the wall floor and roof;
and these are the experience of motion, weight and substance.
Motion refers to the dynamic or inertial sense of the architectural
element--whether it appears to expand, contract or rest in balance.
For example, "As a motion, the roof rises or falls, the walls stand
up or sink, the floor spreads out, climbs or descends." 3 9 Weight
describes the heaviness of elements and how they relate to gravity.
And substance refers to the material or textural sense--in other
words, whether the architectural element is soft or hard, warm or
cold, coarse or fine. These three expressions are, according to
Thiis-Evensen, the basis of shared experience.
In this general discussion Thiis-Evensen classifies the
spatially defining elements, describes characteristics or what he
calls the 'themes' of each of the archetypes, and articulates a
range of possibilities by identifying motifs used for the
implementation of such themes. In the first major section he
explores the three actions through which the floor can impact our
experience: directing, delimiting and supporting. The floor can
direct people from place to place, delimit a space from its context,
and most significant, the floor can support by providing a firm
footing. The supporting theme deals directly with the expressive
potential of the vertical relationship between surface and mass,
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while the delimiting and directional themes are more concerned
with horizontal issues of movement and the relationship between
spaces. The characteristic of support is pervasive in any floor and
therefore takes on the greatest significance in Thiis-Evensen's
study, whereas the horizontal aspects are considered primarily in
terms of their relationship to the forms of support.4 0 He thus
describes and qualifies six motifs of support: the attached floor,
the detached floor, the sunken floor, the rising floor, the open
floor and the directional floor.
The purpose of the wall, according to Thiis-Evensen, is to
delimit space and provide roof support, and can be explored
through three themes: breadth, height and depth. "The depth
indicates the relation between spaces in front of and behind the
wall. The height indicates the relation to the spaces above and
below, which are the ground and roof, and the breadth indicates
the relationship to the spaces which meet the corners to the right
and left."4 1 Contrary to the preceding statement, the height and
breadth themes seem more concerned with visual readings of
surfaces and the implied weight and motion that results from our
perception of such surfaces, rather than any mediation between
spaces. But the depth theme, surprisingly, is a valuable study on
the relationship between wall forms and the spaces they define.
These primary forms are investigated for the possible feelings or
interpretations such an experience might elicit, and they are
considered in terms of how the structural systems and material or
textural applications could influence these forms. Finally, the
mediating qualities between indoor and outdoor of windows and
entries are considered.
The themes of the roof are identified as the basic
vocabulary of roof types: the dome, the barrel vault, the gable
roof, the shed roof and the flat roof. Each of these basic roof
types convey specific expressions which influence our experience
of the space beneath. Besides the obvious shelter function, Thiis-
4 0 Ibid., p. 36, 39.
41Ibid., p. 117.
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Evensen suggests that the roof mediates two other relationships:
the relationship of the interior space to the sky and the
relationship to context. The roof relationship with the sky can
assume one of three possibilities: sinking, rising or neutral. The
horizontal relation to the surroundings can be either exclusionary
and centralizing (as with the dome), or directional and interactive
(as in the gable). Key to this section, and relatively unexplored
elsewhere in his text is a consideration of the relationship between
one space-defining element and another; in this case the impact
upon the roof forms by the wall articulations. The roof
expression depends on the wall in three ways: the spatial form
created by the walls, the height of the walls, and their form of
support. In other words, this chapter begins to take account of
how the wall impacts our understanding of the roof, and therefore
of the entire built fonn.
One of Thiis-Evensen's key acknowledgments is the
relationship between the psychological impact of the archetypes,
and the cultural aspects of the architecture. Harries, referring to
Erwin Panofsky, had argued that the aesthetic experience of
architecture can and even must occur without reference to other
things. 4 2 Gartner had perhaps been more successful in tying
together cultural and universal meanings by describing embodied
experience as having a reverberation at all levels of meaning,
through metaphorical projection. But Thiis-Evensen comes closer
to developing a structure within the relationship between the
universal, and the personal and social levels at least in terms of
deployment strategies of archetypes for functional or
programmatic requirements. His theory of archetypes suggests
that we share certain qualities that bind our responses together to a
certain degree. Thus, for instance, we generally walk swiftly in a
corridor and slowly and ceremoniously in a broad space--and the
designer's desired response at a particular place for one
experience or the other can be implemented based on his
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knowledge of the archetypes. But what is it that drives the
designer's intentions? Not only is it possible that the universal
expression can be influenced by culturally symbolic meanings
and attitudes, those cultural intentions can provide the framework
for the implementation of the archetype. From the designer's
point of view, the universal expression
...is always there as the very reference for (and reinforcement of)
the symbolic meanings. If we stand at the base of a steep stair, the
(universal) expression is the 'resistance' itself which lies in the
steepness. We know what lies ahead as we mount the stair, thus
accepting its invitation. However, the sensation of resistance varies
with the goal at the top. Ascending to the gallows and ascending
to a victory stand are two completely different things. In the
former instance, the resistance could be experienced as reluctance,
in the latter as a challenge to be overcome. ...What the
surroundings do and what we can do in them are not experienced
completely differently from individual to individual rather they
exist as different possibilities within the same 'offer.'
"In summary, we can state that the (universal) expression
has a fundamental effect on our architectural experiences, not as a
quality separate from the symbolic meaning, but as an integrated
part thereof.4 3
Thus, our senses should arouse feelings analogous to a buildings
use. The building program, in its broadest sense, in turn provides
direction for the designer's implementation of these archetypes.
But although Thiis-Evensen has acknowledged the integral
relationship/miteraction between cultural expressions and the
archetypes from a theoretical position, his actual exploration of
the archetypes is often unable to disentangle itself from cultural
constraints. There is little question of Thiis-Evensen's a priori
acceptance, consciously or otherwise, of certain motifs that have
obvious cultural biases. When investigating detailing, for instance,
as in his thorough investigation of the Western classical column,
from capital to fluting, his interpretation is direct and in no way
abstracted. 4 4 To be explicit about the problematic of cultural
characteristics invading any discussion of archetypes we should
consider that any investigation of a universal archetype ought to
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be applicable universally, i.e. anywhere on earth, or anywhere man
resides. We should question the application of the classical
column in most of the world, especially in our modem age.
This problematic is also evident in his acknowledgment that the
meaning of the archetypes is partially constituted through
associations, which Johnson demonstrated tend to be conscious
and therefore difficult to qualify. Because the archetype is in
reality a human theoretical construction (simply because we can
never experience it as such), he should instead be trying to
develop the archetypes as conceptual entities, based on what we
know about man's perceptual an mental capacities, rather than
making direct interpretations of physical form. He illustrates the
system of archetypes with examples from architectural history.
But a confusion has arisen in the use of historical examples of
archetypes, and certain examples have unfortunately been
mistaken for the archetypes. By his own admission, the
archetypes must be abstractions of reality, not the typical within
reality. Yet Archetypes in Architecture at times finds itself slipping
into an historical account of potential interpretations of meaning,
rather than as a text of potential design implications.
This confusion partially stems from Thiis-Evensen's
assumption of the pre-existence of the archetype, which by
definition must always be tainted by cultural influence, rather than
attempting to derive his abstract universal expressions through
perceptual and psychological interpretations of the existing world;
but other structural inconsistencies contribute to the theory's
questionability. The lack of clarity is also enhanced by the
ambiguity and variation on the themes of each type of archetype:
the floor themes are the functional characteristics of supporting
delimiting and directing; the roof themes are the basic types--
dome vault, shed, etc.; and the wall themes distinguish the three
dimensions of the physical form. When the explorations become
more image schematic they are more successful; but two central
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assumptions fundamentally constrain the entire work. First, Thiis-
Evensen's decision to develop the archetypes based on the
delimitation of space and mediation of inside and outside is,
according to Johnson, only a partial description of the patterns
and relationships that structure our understanding. Such a
position assumes that our primary concern of contemporary
existence is basic shelter, which, although self-preservation is ever
present, is not the most basic concern of our everyday lives.
Today, survival has taken on a new meaning, separate from 'basic
shelter'. Although thousands of years ago such primitive survival
instincts were most prominent, the need for survival was not our
essence, but a programmatic necessity. This distinction should be
clear: otherwise our essence would be consistent with all other
animals. The essence we search for is that of the human
experience, which pervades all our actions, including survival
instincts. Playfulness, for example, is obviously part of our
experience, but not directly tied to survival. Second, Thiis-
Evensen's decision to divide the archetypes into the realms of
floor, wall and roof is arbitrary and thus somewhat constraining.
He argues that they are not an arbitrary selection for the basis of
the archetypes because they are the elements that define space;
but the division of the elements, not their selection, is in fact
unnecessary and therefore arbitrary. His emphasis on the
construction of elements that define space should come after an
exploration of space itself; this system of organization inherently
limits its own thinking. Thiis-Evensen should have seen the
fallibility of this structure of the archetypes --the relationship of
inside/outside in terms of the three separate elements of roof, wall
and floor-- when he posed the question "How can the floor be
open or closed?" and could only answer metaphorically. The
suggestion is made that creativity is a function of how the designer
relates these basic forms;45 but if the initial division is arbitrary,
then the division only serves to involve another variable to the
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design equation. While the archetype potential still exists, it
requires more work to create an archetypal experience through
the combination of the three, rather than having a conceptual
understanding of the space to be defined. For Thiis-Evensen, the
division provides a way of creating multiple expressions within the
same space. But there is an inherent danger of ambiguity in
attempting to elicit conflicting expression through the pre-
conscious understanding. This division of delimiting elements
(which forces the author to emphasize the synchronic
relationships between elements) and the constraints of the
containment schemata combine to block any possible exploration
of the archetypes diachronically, i.e. through pedestrian
movement. (The study of the relationships between natural
symbols will be the focus of the next chapter.)
In Thiis-Evensen's theory of archetypes, he derives his
vocabulary through the interpretation of existing built form. As
an alternative however, his vocabulary would have been more
effective and would have made a closer approximation of a
universal expression if it had revolved around concepts of image
schemata rather than around existing physical elements --he
would thus actually have derived the dimensions of physical form
from the conceptual, which is the actual implementation process
of design. It is, of course, necessary to analyze the relationship of
already existing forms to human beings to develop an
understanding. But in providing a vocabulary -- a source book --
logic would dictate a reversal of analysis methodology for future
implementation of a design methodology. Such a conceptual
starting point could find structure in Johnson's image schemata --
abstract, conceptual forms derived from physical relationships that
the pre-conscious uses to structure perception.
Perhaps the most powerful of these schemata, although not
directly discussed by Johnson, is the concept of security. Johnson
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investigated physical relationships to develop his schemas, but
because something like a 'sense of security' is value-laden and has
personal emotional content, it was not considered from a pre-
conscious embodied position. But not only do we structure
understanding through image schemata, we place values on them
as well. Whereas Harries and Thiis-Evensen talk about
commonalities in the experience of space, personal emotional
traits can obviously have an affect on how we respond, and these
emotional characteristics can be considered from an embodied
perspective. Rather than affective appraisal, which was the primary
form of emotional content within Thiis-Evensen's study, this
emotional content is based on what we bring to it. "If then we
want to bring to light the birth of being for us, we must finally
look at that area of our experience which clearly has significance-
and reality only for us, and that is our affective life."4 6
The general concept of security defines a range of
possible schemata, which has been identified and qualified in the
work of Julie Messervy. Messervy's conceptions in landscape
architecture are much closer to Johnson's conceptual schemata.
She demonstrates how childhood experience structures and colors
our understanding and appreciation of the environment, and
argues that as adults we desire places of childhood memory: "I
have built many gardens for clients who believe that they want a
'Japanese garden' for their home. But I know better, it is not an
Oriental paradise that they desire, but a contemplative vision from
their childhoods. They seek, in their busy and over-scheduled
lives, a little place for dreaming in their own backyards. My job,
as I've learned to define it over the years, is to wrest from their
memories the images of beloved contemplative places and recreate
them as three-dimensional form."4 7 As Seamon has noted,
"people become bodily and emotionally attached to their...world.,"
largely in terms of fear, protection, exclusiveness and
preservation.4 8 Thus, as a function of childhood experience,
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47MesNy, Judie Moir,
conemnplsve Gadens
(Charlottesvil, Virgia:
Hene Press, 1990), p. 19.
4 Semon, David, A eogMpby
of the Lifewodd (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1979), p. 70.131.
Embodied Meaning. in Architecture
security plays a fundamental role in constituting a meaningful
world.
The image schemata in memory are based on and
developed from childhood physical experience and Messervy
believes we should acknowledge and embrace the need for
personal and emotional recognition. She identifies the range of
security through a set of 'landscape metaphors', each of which
embody a physical relationship between man and the
environment. These landscape images are the sea, the cave, the
harbor, the promontory, the island, the mountain, and the sky.
The Sea: total immersion and security, perhaps arising out of the
experience of the mother's womb.
The Cave: tight enclosure, secure, but with a visual access through
window on the world; perhaps arising out of being "tightly
swaddled just after birth," or the experience of childhood
bedcovers.
The Harbor: an exploration of space from a protected position--
"protected on three sides but wide open to the fourth, the adult
laps we may have sat in as children were very much like harbors to
us."
The Promontory: experience of the extreme edge-- "After
learning to crawl and then to walk, we became a kind of
promontory in the landscape of our childhood by pushing our
small bodies to the edge of our know world."
The Island: symbolizes an "away-ness" from and total control of
the world: "As we grow up, we start to long for isolated retreats.
We seek more independence from our care-givers, and we long to
travel beyond the limits of our known world."
The Mountain: high, remote places of contemplative solitude: "a
hideout from a world filled with heightened emotions and
turbulent feelings."
The Sky: "The sky suggests the transformation from the physical
self into pure spirit," a total freedom from confinement. "From
early childhood on, many people dream of flying, of becoming
49Messervy, p. 20-21. lighter than air, defying gravity, floating above the earth."49
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The landscape metaphors are image schemata that represent
gradient levels of the concept of security. Although one might
note a similarity in the concept of containment, as discussed by
Johnson, conceptual schemata such as the Harbor or the
Promontory could not have arisen in an investigation of
containment. Nor would we find them in the work of Thiis-
Evensen, where the limitations of the division of wall, floor and
roof make it difficult to work with conceptual gestalts. Thiis-
Evensen offers psychological interpretation of these natural
symbols, but Messervy offers a way of pushing beyond
commonalities and into the personal realms of emotional
response. Her archetypes or landscape metaphors are targeted for
specific individuals or types of people; thus she argues that part of
the designer's goals is to learn about and understand the client.
We must recognize that the potential meaning of any such space is
always relative to the programmatic requirements of space.
Messervy's understanding of a child's physical experience
of space as going through developmental stages --from the womb,
to the security of a parents arms, and beyond-- parallels
commonly held theories in psychology of environmental
development in children. The Hart and Moore Theory, for
example, argues that the frame of reference in childhood goes
through several stages: from an egocentric reference system
(where the body is the only frame of reference for interaction with
the environment), to an allocentric reference system (early
comprehensions of the independent structure of the world that is
distinct from the individual's experience) and finally to a
geocentric reference system (the capacity to construct absolute
space independent o the self and specific objects). It is a process
of decentering toward a coordinated system.
The child decenters from each of the partially coordinated fixed
systems of reference of teh previous stage. Thereafter, through
processes of reciprocal assimilation among the reference systems
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and reflective abstraction between them, he intercoordinates these
structures and advances to a higher plane of thought...Rather than
viewing egocentricity and allocentricity as developmentally
successive reference systems, we may need to see them as
reflecting different spatial skills for engaging the environment,
with environmental conditions, affective states, and task demands
determining in large measure which mode of performance is
employed at a particular time.5 0
Objectivist theories assume a geocentric reference system because
it is the most advanced, ignoring the fact that our experience is a
function of the integrated systems. If architecture tends to be a
connotative, subverted, pre-conscious experience, Messervy
argues, should not part of its sensibility be to exploit these earlier
and more primitive forms of environmental cognition? Likewise,
her concept of security has direct connections to body-image
theory out of psycho-analytic thought. Body-image theory's
fundamental organizing principle is that "we unconsciously locate
our bodies inside a three-dimensional boundary," akin to what
might be referred to as 'personal space.' We adjust our body
position based on psychological attitudes towards our bodies: "if
there is a particular body zone which is physically weak or
vulnerable (such as the back) the shape and texture of the
boundary (of personal space) is modified in respect to that
particular zone, often by establishing defensive psychological
'barriers."' 5 1
If we break down Messervy's work into its basic
assumptions, it is clear that such a theory is based on an idea that
memory is tied into perception in some fundamental way. This
connection, however, is not direct or explicit, because she does not
argue that the schema triggers a particular memory per se, but
more of a feeling--a 'quasi-memory.' This would suggest a partial
separation between memory of perception and memory of our
total experience. Certain cognitive scientists in fact argue that pure
perceptual experience can be stored in memory without
significant processing. "We see no reason to exclude the
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possibility of records (in memory) consisting of relatively
unprocessed perceptual experience, or indeed records of the
perceptual processing or of action sequences. In addition we
include records of interpreted experience." 5 2 Thus, perception
can be directly stored as memory, or perception can be interpreted
and then stored. This points to what might be considered as part
of a pre-consciousness--a space in the mind where mind and body
are in unison--a perceptual memory. Merleau-Ponty cites
examples where people who have lost a limb experience or sense a
'phantom limb' where their limb used to be. But when the nerves
that would normally transfer information from limb to brain are
severed, the phantom disappears. Such case studies imply an
integral relationship between memory and embodied
understanding. Body-image theory also implies a relationship
between childhood memory and perception by focusing on the
early years of perceptual and psychological development . Such
examples only emphasize this connection of body and memory.
Thus our mental constructs might consist of layers of memory,
where psychological reflection is a second order system built on
perceptual memory. Gibson confirms this idea of perceptual
memory by challenging the conventional idea that space is
perceived whereas time is remembered. The sequential dimension
of perception and the continual re-structuring of memory are
implicit and indispensable in the comprehension of the built
environment.
Along with the concept of perceptual memory, the other
unique aspect of Messervy's interpretation is its emotional content.
Perceptual memory has the capability of accessing memory either
in image and certainly in feeling. Not only do we have a pre-
conscious understanding, but a pre-conscious perceptual memory,
and the ability to make both conceptual and perceptual
associations through this pre-conscious memory. In childhood
experience a natural symbol is encoded in the mind as an image
52Morton, and Berkerian,
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schema. An attitude is formed about that space based on the total
spectrum of possible influences: cultural, social, spatial,
psychological, etc. When we re-experience such a spatial schema,
even without the other components, our perceptual memory has
the ability to refire the actual memory or the feeling, consciously
or otherwise, of the original childhood experience. Emotional
experiences have three components: behavioral, psychological and
mental. And acknowledging that emotion has a physical
component (adrenaline variations, as an example) pre-supposes
the interconnection between the perceptual and emotional.
Association with a past experience comes only when the new
experience is understood in light of the past experience. This
understanding is a function of the similarity between the past
image schema and the new one. Both, in the mind's abstraction
process, have been reduced to some comprehensible pattern.
Merleau-Ponty argues that our emotional lives--our reality--is
"shot through with intelligence." 5 3 Although the objective world
has no room for elementary emotions, the value of emotion is ever
present in all experiences; and that affectivity is always a part,
however small, of our thought processes. Perception never
functions in isolation. Whereas emotional content seems to make
a designer's job more difficult because of the immediate variation
it brings about from person to person, empirical evidence suggests
otherwise; positive mood influences memory and enhances
perceptual awareness; level of perception
Harries suggests another possible basis for the emotional
content of spatial experience, acknowledging the intertwined
relationship between time and space psychologically. He believes
that out of our fears of vulnerability and mortality--distinctly
human fears of our own self-awareness--comes an inter-
relationship between physical shelter and psychological shelter.
"As important as physical control is psychological control... If we
can speak of architecture as a defense against the terror of space,
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we must also recognize that from the very beginning it has
provided defenses against the terror of time."5 4 Harries, quoting
Schopenhauer: "'Man consciously draws every hour nearer his
death; and at times this makes life precarious business even to the
man who has not already recognized this charactcr of constant
annihilation in the whole of life itself. Mainly on this account,
man has philosophies and religions.' Schopenhauer could have
added art, and more especially, architecture. Shelter promises
protection from time's terror. To feel sheltered is to have
banished feelings of vulnerability and mortality." 5 5 Part of
architecture's function is to help man deal with the fear of death
by providing a sense of security. He suggests that comfort comes
through the reliving of childhood experiences. Our childhood
security, based on our relation to parents, places, and our youthful
ignorance of reality constitute a 'motionless childhood' within
memory.
Whereas Thiis-Evensen's work attempts to seek out the
commonalities of experience in emotionaland psychological
interpretation, Messervy is pointing out the individual differences
and suggesting how they come about. More importantly for us,
however, she is demonstrating a 'range of possibilities' which one
could say are the range of possible image schemata from a
psycho-analytic perspective of personal security: psychological
shelter and its physical manifestations. Messervy pulls in the
personal but in the process defines a range of universals.
This conception of a range of possible experience runs parallel to
Harries belief that freedom is to be constrained only by one's
essence. Although the use of these individual landscape
metaphors will be more effective when designing for one or a
small group of people, they do have the potential to be used
publicly, because of their inherent physical qualities; but their
effectiveness will be much more varied without an understanding
of the users, and ultimately can only be an approximation. But
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they can be used in the higher probability that they will extract the
desired response. She argues that our childhood development
passes all of us through these stages, thus giving us a fairly
common access. However, Messervy also notes that particular
places may have significance for an individual or group of
individuals, which can only be known through extensive
interaction with the client. The possibility is also there to pull out
trends in a community, that might lean that society toward a
specific appreciation of certain schema. Can a distinction be
made, for instance, between those who grow up in the western
United States and those who grow up in the east, or, say, in
Europe? Taking from my own experience of living in Arizona
and coming to the dense urban environment of Boston and the
densely wooded areas of New England I realized the physical
characteristic I missed more than anything was open space, or a
sense of extension and view. Such distinctions begin to indicate
the possibility of culturally or regionally-bound embodied
meanings, which differ from culturally generated meanings.
Embodiment is considered in light of generalized conceptions of
a particular context. Where Harries and Norberg-Schulz nostalgic
tendencies evidence themselves is where they both argue against
the chaos of infinite space as a reasonable experience. The
theoretical beauty of Messervy's work is that she identifies it as a
possibility, but does not attempt to qualify it.
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Since Einstein first challenged the security and stability of
our objective, scientific understandin of the world with the
introduction of his theory of relativity in 1919, there has been on-
going interest in how aesthetic reception takes place within the
effects of the temporal dimension of experience: experience here
conceived in the broadest sense of the term. Considerations of time
and movement subverted the unified structures of meaning
prominent in classical realist representations. The illusion of
aesthetic unity was of primary concern of the early Frankfurt School,
especially of the writer and theatrical producer Bertolt Brecht, and
the critics that imported his ideas into film theory. In his critical
dialogue with George LukAcs on the aesthetics of the real, Brecht
consistently pushed for an open interpretation of history, and,
therefore, an open aesthetic practice; 'open' meaning a practice that
did not attempt a false construction of closure in a social
environment that distinctly denied such true unity. Brecht realized
that Lukac's reductive range did not allow any response to changes
within contemporary civilization. The only way to respond to an
evolving world was through systems that could adapt to the
continually evolving challenges of the modern world. Brecht shaped
and formed an aesthetic theory for theatre that accomodated this
necessity for an open and developing aesthetic practice based on the
forms of construction, not the form of the total system. In the 1934
essay "Author as Producer," Walter Benjamin not only attempted to
facilitate the reception of the work of his close friend Brecht, but he
also attempted to translate Brecht's ideas for a critical transformative
aesthetic practice into other artistic realms, especially literature. 1
1Benjamin, Walter, 'The Author
as Producer," in The Essential
Frankfurt School Reader (New
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1980).
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The essay was an attempt to elaborate on the possibility of an
entirely new relationship between author, work and audience.
Benjamin understood the distinct production of thought in the
Brechtian 'Epic theatre' as being of significant value to an aesthetic
practice implicated through the Marxist movement. Certainly with
the fifty years that have passed since Brecht first began to develop
his theory of Epic theatre, our empirical knowledge base has
expanded our range to see beyond much of the early 20th century
Marxist rhetoric, especially in terms of an artistic practice's political
power/potential for any transformation of the capitalist mode of
production. Brecht's impact on the theatre as an institution has been
significant but it is certainly questionable whether his work or the
work of others who have emulated his techniques have had any real
political effect. With hindsight it is not difficult to see that Brecht
and Benjamin were both overly optimistic regarding the political
effect such works could have, and were wrong to think that there was
something in the form itself which could deliver liberation. "But the
fact that they were historically wrong does not mean that the new
rhetoric made available cannot be used for different ends: they are
not wrong theoretically, because it is at least arguable that it is
posssible to resist mass culture,"2 or more specifically resist
consumption and passivity.
The German-born Brecht came to maturity during World
War I and its aftermath. For the Germany of the Weimar period, it
was an incredibly thought-provoking era, for two main reasons.
Berlin's location between Paris and Moscow allowed access to
developments on either side and the German people, having lost the
war and in the grips of a devestating economic situation, were now
more willing to question the world around them. The religious
oppression he experienced coming from a Jewish family led Brecht
to look eastward towards Marxism which transcended such
impositions, and to the new artistic movements in the Soviet Union.
Perhaps as influential in Germany of that time were the pre-war
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French movements, especially Dadaism. Thus Brecht was
developing his own ideas in the midst of extensive rethinking of the
aesthetic realm. One of the most productive dialogues Brecht
became involved in during the 1920's and 30's was with Lukgcs, a
social critic who, like Brecht, looked to Marx, but unlike Brecht, was
attempting to construct a closed realist aesthetic philosophy to
accomplish his own goals. But Brecht rejected Lukics' realism as
ineffective: the multiple perspectives that Lukdcs sought through his
realist model in no way denied the absorbtion of the spectator into
the work. This, according to Brecht, promoted a passive society, in
as much as the reproduction of reality says almost nothing about that
reality. Lukics was taking his model out of the traditional 19th
century form of the realist novel, which, in Brecht's mind, was
descriptive rather than explanatory. Lukdcs was directly critical of
Brecht's work because he feared fragmentation and artificiality in the
modem world that would inevitably make it impossible to achieve a
"wholesome existence." Thus Lukdcs was reductive when it came to
the range of revolutionary work; his doctrine of literary realism
denied all other potential forms. Brecht thus questioned the Marxist
base of LukAcs' model: the structure had been created from a
previous period in history, but the social reality of consumption had
radically evolved since that time, and the realist model in no
substantial way accounted for this. Thus LukAcs, while describing
the so-called modem writers as "formalists" was in fact falling into a
formalist mode by usurping literary tradition without regard for new
and changing historical and social reality. "It is precisely the open
nature of history which makes it Utopian or illusory to call for an
alternative art which is closed: in fact, this closure can only be on the
terms laid down by the dominant ideology ...which must represent
history as permanently and perpetually over." 3 For Brecht, the
Marxist should not attempt to construct a closed world, but should
respond to change within contemporary civilization.
3Wollen, Peter, "Manet:
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In opposition to Lukacs' limited range, Brecht saw the need
to substitute the contemplative or passive bourgeois art form with an
active, participatory art, in order to subvert the artistic production's
continual consumption. It was his belief that a lack of unity for the
object would lead to a lack of unity for the subject, creating the
disruption necessary for revolution to occur. His emphasis in this
evolving theory was on form, but in response to Lukdcs' exclusivity,
he pressed to avoid rigid definition of form. What this interaction
between these two men ultimately achieved was critical: Lukdcs'
imposed limitations led Brecht to a search for formal techniques
rather than a formal totality. Through formal techniques Brecht
emphasized the aesthetic form's capacity to evolve with the ever-
changing contemporary scene, and therefore be a reflection of our
expanding knowledge. Brecht's conception of techniques was a
significant breakthrough in his development of an aesthetic for the
stage, and it evolved into Epic theatre, which brought together the
advanced formal tendencies and the concern for political content.4
Brecht percieved man as a fully malleable being, and was
primarily concerned with developing theories of reception in the
theatre, in an attempt to bring about a social transformation from the
conditions of his moment. He saw his drama as an 'experiment' or
laboratory' that brings to consciousness the prescence of the theatre
so that the audience does not become submerged within the work. It
was more important to tell the spectator he is in a theatre than to try
and imitate reality. By juxtaposing backstage activity with the
narrative dialogue of the plot, the fictionality of the theatrical
production was brought to light. The aesthetic image, if the theatre
was to be truly productive, had to break the auratic image: aura being
based on a tradition of unique, complete and unified entities. Epic
theatre became, in his attempt to manipulate the spectator, a political
narrative that was not about developing action, but representing
conditions through multiple systems; more significantly, however,
Epic theatre does not "reproduce (these) conditions, but rather,
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reveals them." It was therefore Brecht's tendency toward abstraction
or to schematize reality to make these conditions clear. The goal was
to "stir the viewer into assuming an active and critical attitude 'vis a
vis' the work of art, in oppostion to the traditional work which
promotes passivity by tending to absorb the viewer within its
parameters" 5 When given the opportunity, the masses were much
more capable of reason than typical bourgeois gave them credit for,
and it was upon this rationality that Brecht was counting on --that
reason was meant to triumph over emotion. By denying the
reciever's emotional absorbtion into the tragic text, the spectator
would be imparted by these techniques to rationally and critically
consider the content of the work. Thus, through this dialectical
relationship between work and receiver, co-authorship begins to take
place as the receiver puts together the fragmented system to discover
the significance in his own mind. The aesthetic practice should
contribute to a production of meaning and knowledge that reinforces
an emphasis on a thinking subject. In contemporary civilization, the
unthinking subject is the greatest danger of all. This was a
participatory self-education leading to an alienation from the
conditions of existence, rather than an identification with a "tragic
hero." Brecht believed that this would lead to the destruction of the
unified totality of the aesthetic aura. And by breaking the auratic
image, Brecht was encouraging rational, independent judgement
from the viewer regarding the content, not simply the artistic form, as
was the typical bourgeois response. The spectator is no longer able
to submit-to an uncritical response to the theatre.
His theatre aims to show that between the outward objectification of
the subject and its inner experience there is a split, which will
become critical in the capitalist world. The subject is encouraged to
think of its individuality as independent of capitalist relations, and is
therefore unable to see its own objectivity. Both objects and subjects
are represented as given and it is this which leads to reification.6
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Brecht therefore saw himself as purporting and revealing a "true
realism" where the masses discover the social conditions of their
existence through the work; his approach held much more potential
for emancipation than did Lukgcs' closed system.
Brecht's intent was thus to instill a feeling of alientation or
estrangement in the spectator in the process of breaking down the
auratic image in order to fight passive reception. Estrangement7
"consists in turning the object of which one is to be made aware to
which one's attention is to be drawn, from something ordinary,
familiar, immmediately accessible, into something peculiar, striking
and unexpected..." 8 Rather than an'integrated work of art'--where
the integration means that the various elements are fused and in the
totalization process disappear--he emphasized the separation of
elements. "We want a text whose fissures and differences (in this
separation) constantly demand an activity of articulation from the
subject."9 We find Merleau-Ponty saying virtually the same thing
regarding perceptual mechanisms fifteen years later: "Movement,
expressing a relationship...demands a mental operation." 10 Taking
from Surrealist shock tactics, it was Brecht's intent to get at the
receiver's consciousness through perception, rather than
representations. In order to induce a critical distance and fight
passivity, Brecht developed methods that revolved around several
primary awareness techniques.
The first and most central of these techniques is
'interruption,' which challenges the audience and attempts to pull
them out of their narcosis through the introduction of the radical,
novel, or unexpected. Epic theatre continually attempts to alter the
viewer's perception through the interruption of rhythmic patterns, a
change in perspective, an unexpected phrase, or a shift in
temperament or attitude. It was not unusual for Epic theatre to break
into comedic song in the middle of a dramatic moment Interruption,
Brecht claimed, could pervade all aesthetic realms. The following is
the poem "The Stone Fisherman" by Brecht:
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The big fisherman has appeared again. He sits in his rotted
boat and fishes from the time when the first lamps flare up
early in the morning until the last one is put out in the evening.
The villagers sit on the gravel of the embankment and watch him,
Grinning. Hefishesfor herring but he pulls up nothing but
Stones.
They all laugh. The men slap their sides, the women hold on to
their bellies, the children leap high into the air with laughter.
When the big fisherman raises his torn net high and finds the
stones in it, he does not hide them but reaches far out with his
strong brown arm, seizes the stone, holds it high and shows it
to the unlucky ones. 11
The fisherman sets the scene as objective perception; but with two
words--"unlucky ones"--the author has moved from a framework of
description to a subjective perpective loaded with content and
attitude. Interruption is the "freezing of a moment so that instead of
looking at things we have to examine the relationships between
them." 12 The positing of these relationships brings about a
distancing and shock, a way of breaking the auratic identity of
objects and ideas for an identity defined by differences--i.e. the
relationships that define them. This concept is defined as the 'gest.'
The gest...is a set of relationships revealed by an interruption. But
these relationships will only serve to astonish insofar as they have
first been subsumed under an identity. In other words it is when the
world of pleasure and belief is interrupted that we set up desire and
knowledge but it is necessary to start there where there is an identity
in order to achieve the separation. 13
Brecht proposes that there is a radical aesthetic pleasure in the
interruption of the illusion of self-contained identity.14
Intimately integrated into interruption is the concept of
montage. Montage is a formal system that recognizes the autonomy
of individual parts, the significance of the relationship between parts,
and in its own fragmentation is key to the fragmentation of the
subject. Brecht's Epic theatre could be likened to a filmstrip--a
11Brecht, Bertolt, Selected
Poems (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1947), p. 145.
12MacCabe, p. 49.
13Ibid.- p. 49-50.
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formal system that could be cut into self-stable pieces, with a
consistent background in content--the social conditions of man.
Unlike Eisenstein's early filmic model of montage where the
juxtaposition was only a temporal one, Brecht's montage exists in
time and space. By having multiple activities going on on stage
simultaneously a more immediate juxtaposition of ideas, and
therefore of differences and interruptions would take place. Brecht
had hoped that relationships of montage would result in the
construction of meaning: "what is important is that in the separation
of elements the spectator gets separated out of this unity and
homogeneity--this passivity--in order to enter into an active
15Ibid., p. 48. appropriation of the scenes presented to him." 15 And rather than
have these separate scenes pulled together into a cohesive plot,
Brecht emphasized the importance of the particular scene. As in his
production of "Galileo," where historical significance of the play's
lead character was already well documented, the suspense of Epic
theatre belongs to the individual events, not necessarily to an
outcome we may already be familiar with. One of Brecht's primary
methods of implementing montage was through new technologies,
ultimately leading to multi-media productions. Part of the agenda of
modernity of the early 20th century was social advancement through
the liberation of technological advancement. Such advances
provided a way to challenge traditional conceptions of theatre; by
introducing film into drama, for example, Brecht was able to create a
certain novelty, and at the same time establish a certain relationship
between the film and the action on stage. Brecht in essence wanted
to exploit all possible methods of infusing understanding, even at
different levels of mental processing. "In my view the great and
complicated things that go on in the world cannot be adequately
recognized by people who do not use every possible aid to
6brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p. understanding." 16 With hindsight however, as Theodore Adorno has
73. noted, modem technology seeks passivity through a totally
Time, Movement and Meaning
manipulated environment and a controlled response, rather than
providing an impetus for significant social change.
In his attempt to separate out the subject, Brecht denies any
possible emotional identification or attachment to the work. He was
less concerned with filling the spectator with emotions than
alienating him from the conditions in which he lives. For the clarity
necessary for a critical distance he rejects all empathy with the plot
or the stirring fate of a tragic hero. Emotional association could only
result in intellectual minimalization. In opposition to the immediate
gratification of emotional identification that typifies the theatre,
Brecht attempted to build a desire in the incompleteness of the
separated state of Epic theatre. "Caught in the homogeneous state of
consciousness...we will find desire and knowledge." 17 In the
dissociation of emotion, Brecht wanted to affirm what he saw as the
subversive energy and anarchistic tendency of the basic human
drives. Anticipation builds a desire that cannot be fulfilled in the
theatre itself.
Brecht's concept of techniques defines a powerful method of
organizing and constructing a malleable and evolving aesthetic
practice. His theatrical works are compositions of specific formal
techniques that provide a certain flexibility in coping with a changing
world. These techniques are often specific to theatre yet have their
counterparts in other arts. A theory of construction, rather than a
totalizing whole, is more condusive to projection and translation--
historically and categorically--because any or all of these constituent
parts may be imported, while the unified whole has certain internal
structural formations that cannot be altered without weakening or
breaking down the entire system. In shifting from representation of
plot to perception of relationships Brecht in essence turns perception
"into an object" open to scutiny. "In the concept of technique, I have
named that concept which makes literary products directly accessible
to a social and therefore a materialist analysis." 18 Or any other
analysis for that matter: as Adorno has noted, Brecht's work would
17MacCabe, 49.
18Benjamin, "Author as
Producer," p. 25.
Time, Movement and Meaning
not have held the same power without its political saturation.
Brecht's theory of interruption and co-authorship may evolve out of a
political tendency to educate the masses, but they are effective and
affective forms open and available to appropriation by all socio-
political orientations.
Brecht's specific techniques are dynamic methods of forming
relationships between elements, and between spectators and
elements, which therefore demand the receiver's appropriation of
space-time. The techniques of interruption and montage are flexible,
sophisticated theoretical systems for invoking or accomodating
temporal experience: in the theatre or in architecture. What become
significant and meaningful are the critical differences that arise in the
gest. Gestual techniques are fundamentally diachronic, in that our
perception of relationships requires some sort of sequence. Likewise
we find that desire, a product of the technique of emotional
dissociation, also suggests a temporal character in its incompleteness;
desire seeks gratification--and to seek is to move--and in movement
as a function of desire there always exists an implicit imminence.
Jacques Derrida also favored the dynamic character of time
and movement in his post-structuralist subversion of the textual
narrative. His relativist assumption was a critical response to the
static and illusory nature of structuralism. Western civilization tends
to favor certainty, superiority, assuredness; it is a culture where the
authority and security of the objective explanation of our world is
given priority to the actual experience of that world. Structuralism is
the twentieth century manifestation of this position. Structuralist
thought seeks knowledge from an objective, ahistorical, impersonal
and scientific perspective. Saussure's linguistic theory of semiotics
helped to lay the foundation for structuralism. "Semiotics is the
discipline which seeks to describe the underlying systems of
distinctions and conventions that enable objects and activities to have
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meaning. It stresses the role of symbolic systems on human
experience and thus reorganizes our perception of the world from
that of autonomous objects to systems of relations." 19 Saussure's
Course of General Linguistics was a synchronic project that
generated methodological models, but not meaning; it suggested that
the names we attach to things had little relevance. He proposed a
two-step process to investigate language: the definitive step was to
draw a defined synchronic enclosure around that to be investigated,
and the second step was to look at the frozen moment to explain
meaning in language. He argued against looking for the actual
empirical use of discourse to understand its structure and discover its
meaning, but rather, suggested we look to the system of
signification. It was the uncontrollable and relativist status of
empirical linguistics that turned Saussure to clamp down on
possibilities. Structuralist thought permeated diverse intellectual
activities and the search for knowledge focused on basic themes and
timeless structures that were supposedly the foundation for our
world. Claude Levi-Strauss likened these timeless structures to a
type of fundamental grammar.
The post-structuralist project represents modem humanity's
attempt to reconcile the inaiequacies of objectivity with reality. This
philosophy is wary of the closed system of semiotic analysis and
intends to destabilize and transform structuralism by introducing
time and history, thus positioning and re-positioning structuralist
thought in a space and time of dynamic acitivity. Post-structuralism
challenges our capacity to discover first and final causes of meaning,
and argues against traditional divisions of fields of knowledge. This
position acknowledges the incongruency between objectivist forms
of analysis and our experience of apprehending meaning; such forms
of analysis arose primarily out of scientific discourse. Post-
structuralism is a critique but not only so: it opens up a space to
allow a new order to arise out of the failures of the current structure
of knowledge, and yet is inclusive of much of what preceded it
19Koukoutsi, Valeria,
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"The boundaries between structuralism and post-structuralism cannot
be clearly defined. However, post-structuralism promotes
interaction, plurality, and contradiction which produce new meanings
(and) new relationships." 2 0 Time and history have become the new
consciousness.
A significant part of the post-structuralist project, like
structuralism, has come from theories of language, primarily
developed in the work of Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida. A
new field of thinking was put into play by these critiques on
language called deconstruction. "Initially, deconstruction could be
defined as a reading and a production (writing) that attempted to
reveal the abscence of a transcendental signified."2 1 Deconstruction
suggests that there can be no pure signified in language or elsewhere;
language is in a process of motion where there will always be
slippage in relation to context. After Barthes had declared the 'death
of the author'--the insignificance of authorship relative to the
dispersal of meaning in the reading and interpretation of the receiver-
-theories of reception came to dominate aesthetic discourse.
Although an author's intent may be well grounded in the production
process, its meaning can be eclipsed by that which the reader brings
to it. Derrida introduces the concept of diffdrance which allows for
the contextual movement which is directed at subverting structuralist
philosophy. As part of his notion of differance, Derrida includes
deferral, which postpones any stable relationship between language
and meaning; to defer meaning is to await the presence of someone
to the text; meaning is not presented ready-made. Derrida argued
against the structuralist conception of signification analysis and
attempted to rewrite Saussure in order to destabilize it. He posits
meaning within the dynamics of motion and time. For instance, if
we look at a word in the middle of a sentence, we cannot really know
its full meaning until the end of the sentence; likewise, if the
sentence is in mid-paragraph, the meaning of the word is still
implicated. We can see this extension continuing from paragraph to
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chapter to book...and beyond. Derrida believes that its meaning can
never be fully isolated. Thus words do not have their full meaning
when we encounter them, although their room for movement
becomes more and more restricted the further away from them we
get. Every present is marked by a trace of the past and implicated for
the future. Derrida argues that it is impossible to grasp all meaning
at any moment; the diachronic character denies any totalization. This
suggests that meaning is not only a product of content, but also
comes from the methodology and structure of the text. The emphasis
has here been shifted to the signifier and syntactical relationships; in
other words it is more about the form meaning takes than it is an
exploration of and attempt to define the semantic content 2 2 This
change in focus is justified in part by linguistic studies which suggest
that syntactic capacity, not semantics, is the basis of human cognitive
skills and intelligence.2 3
The other strain of Derrida's differance' is directed at
Heidegger's metaphysics--a philosophy of phenomenal presence,
which suggested a certain possibility of the 'givenness' of meaning
in the world. For Heidegger, presence is intertwined with 'being'
where objects are inseparable from their universe. It is a form of
thinking that posits a world of truth and aspires to discover the
natural, as opposed to a world of appearances. That which
transcends time is the ultimate of Heideggerian metaphysics, and has
manifested itself in everything from religion through to classical
thought. Deconstruction reveals and opposes the authority and
opppressive power of metaphysical assumptions of philosophy and
knowledge. Derrida argues that although a sign has a certain
capacity to break from its context, "there is no experience of pure
presence," rather there is only "chains of differential marks." 24 If
there can be no experience of pure presence there cannot be any
transcendental objective signified. Our perception of the world is not
a function of presences but differences--which implies a relational
cognitive structure rather than the binary systems that Levi-Strauss
22Derrida, Jacques, "Signature
Event Context," in Margins of
Philosophy (Chicago:
University of Chicago
P-ess,1982)
23For more information on this
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24Derrida, p. 318.
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had argued structured our thought. Derrida argues that knowledge
cannot be grasped without representation and he uses the term 'text'
to define the representational condition--everything is a text and
every text is undecidable in principle. The text is a form of
communication already in movement, where the 'absence' of the
addressor from the marks that have been abandoned is not a
presence, but a representation; although an object may not be a
representation in itself, in our apprehension and comprehension it
must always be as such.
The theory of deconstruction results in destabilization and
deferral; Derrida's critique relativises everything. But given this
dispersal of meaning, how can aesthetic theory compensate to have
any productive representational system whatsoever? In other words,
as producers, how do we clamp down on signs, to make them
accessible after removing the metaphysical authority? Norman
Bryson25 argues that Derrida's reading is valuable to a position of
semiotics to reveal forces within the cultural system; deconstruction
helps to consolidate positionality. But as a technique for
interpretation it can only result in a continual undermining of
meaning; it is an excellent preliminary stage--but a disasterous final
reading. The deconstructional criticism of structuralism is a positive
move, but we must realize that because of the limitations of our
representations as only abstractions of reality, any analysis must be
by definition, incomplete. Further, such theories as have been
imported into the realm of architecture have not compensated for
architecture's inherently less explicit character, and as we have seen
from chapter one, such dispersal of meaning is more characteristic of
perception.
Nicole Pertuiset questions the idealism of, and inherent
limitations to a consideration of architecture in terms of structuralist
and post-structuralist linguistic theory. There are intrinsic
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differences between language and architectural aesthetics, and such
cross-categorical equivalencies have historically resulted in
misunderstood projections, from the purely representational character
of language to the relatively abstract realm of architecture. Venturi's
seduction by denotative semantics is a perfect example. Pertuiset
argues that this comparison of language and architecture produces
theory non-cognizant of that which is distinct to architecture; textual
representation makes no acknowledgement of perception's more
significant role within the artistic realms, nor in the greater stability
of the linguistic sign than the architectural sign. The intellectual
emphasis overshadows and ultimately subverts body-responsive
architecture. The concept of 'text' emphasizes conscious 'reading'
rather than interactive experience: "...post-structuralist studies of
architecture based on literary criticism have been mostly pre-
occupied with the conception of archtecture as a text, stripped away
of any temporal, material or experiential qualities."2 6 Although the
concept of 'text' implies temporal aspects, it emphasizes more of a
concern for cognitive interpretation, and less about how people
actually form relationships to the environment. In other words,
textual theory projections into architecture do not identify and
qualify the discrepancy between how the architectural participant
apprehends his text and how the reader of the linguistic text
apprehends his. Such an oversight implies that both readings come
from the same and therefore static point. Further, the 'reading' of the
architectural text as an explicit, cognitive , aesthetic construct only
contributes to architecture's inability to resist its own consumption by
the media industry. Architecture has lent itself, Pertuiset says, to the
signifier/signified dichotomy in response to the ideology of
consumerism and advertising. Explicit representation in architecture
is a manifestation of the power of the culture industry. To resist
commodification, she argues, architecture must acknowledge and
exploit that which is inherent to itself. "It is neither as concepts, nor
as formal objects, but as the place of actual and lived experience that
26Pertuiset, Nicole, "The
Floating Eye," Journal of
Architectural Education (New
York: ACSA Press, 1990), p. 7.
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and experience, as opposed to
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'reading.'
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we will resist the subjection of architecture to our culture of
equivalence, and that the realm of its autonomy may be defined."2 7
Pertuiset advocates a re-emphasis on the experiential aspects
of architecture, but from a position significantly displaced from
typical phenomenological models. The dilemma underlying
architectural discourse is twofold. "On one hand because of the
capacity our eyes have to overcome the four-dimensionality of space
and time to the extent that space itself can be read three-
dimensionally at once as a perspectival 'picture' or 'sign' prior to any
movement of bodies, we reduce architecture to a culture of surfaces.
On the other hand, as if it were a question of choosing between two
approaches, we focus on the experiential and seek to reintroduce
aspects of body to oppose and resist the current pictorial depreciation
of architecture." 2 8 Taking from the research of John Schumacher
(see Chapter One), she insists not so much that we give too much
importance to vision, but rather that we have limited its function.
"Schumacher's research addresses the nature of the connections
between the various things in the world in virtue of how we make
places in the world with our bodies - human posture - which
consequently offers valuable insights into the nature of our
urchitectural experience."29 As we have seen, Schumacher argues
lat our methods of inquiry are implicated by how we conceive of
ourselves within the world, and that there are two fundamental ways
in which we relate to each other and the environment: one in which
we consider the world from an imaginary objective point and
develop abstract, mutually accessible readings of the world--abstract
viewing; and the other, 'natural seeing' which gives us a dynamic
sense of the distance that separates us from events and places.
Rather than from an abstract position, both Schumacher and Pertuiset
agree that we must conceive of the world and indeed of architecture
in terms of both time and space, and in terms of our own bodies: we
are always embedded in an order of movement. If we look upon the
world from an objective viewpoint, we distance our analysis from
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our existence. Images of abstract viewing have a tendency to
transform events into fixed singular moments. We have become
completely seduced by the possibility to read simultaneously all
aspects of the world...," 30 and this has only perpetuated the
mind/body split. This seduction is imminent in the wake of fears of
relativism. Pertuiset argues that the form of our conception of the
world inherently structures the way we think about space; for
example, our ways of representing architecture in drawings denies
co-authorship, or that the participant plays any part in the formation
of meaning. Today, the abstract viewpoint of objectivism has
become the convention of architectural discourse. "It is ironic that
critics of modernism, including so-called 'post-modemisists,' should
have retained the posture of the viewpoint, but on the other hand, it
seems inevitable since the objectivity of the 'world in view' offers us
a reassuring positivism in the face of our relativistic culture."3 1
Pertuiset chasitizes contemporary architects for dissociating the
synchronic and diachronic aspects of the architectural phenomenon,
despite recent scientific and philosophical speculations to the
contrary. The idealzed forms of historicism, for example, indicative
of this division, and are a product of the inability to perceive and
understand "the complex dialectical process of historical
sedimentation by which these forms were ascertained.." 32
Pertuiset demonstrates that it is within movement that we can
tie the synchronic and diachronic together for architecture, and
argues that an emphasis on vision as a function of movement has the
capacity to resist consumption. Movement, which can only be
conceived of through the temporality of natural seeing, promotes
those qualities which are relational, therefore intangible and difficult
to commodify. A consideration of movement pre-supposes the time
variable's place within the aesthetic equation. Given the privileged
role movement plays in perceptual activity (see Gibson Chapter One)
such a theory holds the capacity to bring architecture, time and
perception together. As in architecture, Pertuiset notes that
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movement is inherent in the cinematic image. Thus, taking from
Gilles Deleuze, Pertuiset proposes a filmic model for architecture,
where the body, not the camera, is the privileged center. "I will.
attempt to locate aspects that precede the significant system of
architecture while still pertaining to the image in the belief that
architecture and cinema engage us in a radically different way than
33Pertuiset, "The So-Called literary texts.",33 Though she notes that architecture and cinema are
Cinematic Promenade of La fundamentally different in that architecture is experienced by a
Villette," p. 70.
mobile subject, while cinema allows an immobile subject to have the
experience of movement, the author suggests that the primary aspects
of image and movement substantially constitute and thus relate
architecture and cinema. " The great directors of the cinema think
34Deleuze, Gilles, Cinema 1: with 'movement-images' and time-images' instead of concepts..." 34
The Movement-Image (London: In Cinema 1: The Movement Image, Deleuze identifies two types of
Athlone Press, 1983), p. 7.
movement that in effect correspond to Schumacier's distinction
betweeen postures. First he identifies 'immobile sections' of space, in
which movement is reconstituted in the simple transitions of self-
contained 'poses'or forms. Deleuze notes the illusionary nature of
immobile sections as closed sets that can only exist in abstract time.
The immobile section typifies Western conventions in art where all is
given within the surface or form itself. The second movement he
elaborates on is referred to as 'mobile sections' of movement which
function in the reality of our relativistic world to produce qualitative
change. The mobile section is real movement within a concrete
duration. Thus cinematic movement has two aspects: that abstract
time which relates the closed sets of individual frames of a film to
create the illusion of continuity and those mobile section or actions
which cross and relate the immobile sections (frames) to express the
duration of the film. Space is divisible into instantaneous units,
whereas movement is not: "Real movement will always elude us at a
35Pertuis, "The So-Called 'point of view' becasue it can never be simply present3 It is always
Cinematic Image ofLa Villette," in the process of presencing. In concept, the immobile section is a
p. 72.
function of Schumacheres abstract viewing, whereas the mobile
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sections relate to natural seeing. They are what Deleuze refers to as
perception-image and movement-image, respectively. Modem film
is considered as a continuity of movement, rather than a series of
unique moments--in other words the relations between perspective-
images are what are privileged, not the images themselves. Although
cinema is a two-dimensional representation and therefore the
movement-image to which Deleuze refers must be, by its very nature
a form of abstract viewing, as a model of consciousness for
architecture, it takes on another role. Time in the objective world of
abstract viewing, must be an independent variable. But in
architecture Pertuiset suggests the possibility of another image.
Ultimately, in light of Schumacher's reconception of vision in terms
of modem scientific relativity theories, she posits that architectural
space can be designed to give rise to the time-space image where
movement replaces space as the foundational element. The obvious
difficulty here is the limitations to our own capacity to represent the
four dimensionality of movement for analysis. But by treating
movement as the primary material of architecture, design would
begin to challenge the aura of the aesthetic whole in architecture.
Part of Pertuiset's criticism of the abstract viewpoint as it often
manifested itself in architecture was the attempt to establish complete
and unified structures. The objective abstract viewpoint perpetuates
the illusionism of the aesthetic whole; but because movement is
fundamental to our existence, the architectural whole is neither given
nor giveable. When we construct the unity of the whole, we constrict
the possibility of real movement. According to Deleuze, the whole,
if we can consider it as such, is the duration of time--our
consciousness--and must remain open and changeable.
Bernard Tschumi makes explicit use of a cinematic model in
his Manhattan Transcripts, and Pertuiset notes his use of cinema
within the Promenade of Gardens at Tschumi's Parc de La Villette.
Tschumi had previously introduced the concept of 'experienced
space' that attempted to resolve the dichotomy of conceived space
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and perceived space.3 6 Conceived space referred to our reasoning
capacity, and our ability to mold architecture through ideas.
Perceived space on the other hand referred to the physical sensation
of the environment: a bodily responsiveness that had long been
forgotten in contemporary architecture. The paradox here, he argues,
is that architecture is always at once both conceived and perceived,
and yet these are radically opposed to one another. Tschumi re-
articulated the mind/body split in order to resolve it in 'experienced
space'--which bridged sensory perception and reason. As a method
of manipulating and applying 'experienced space' Tschumi
introduced the filmic model in his Manhattan Transcripts. He
suggests that value in the architectural experience only arises in the
relationship between space, movement and event. Event is here
conceived of as the spectacle of performance of some task, function
or program. The Transcripts are meant to expose the complex
relationship between "spaces and their use, between the set and the
script..." Ultimately, he says, "the Transcripts try to offer a
different reading of architecture in which space, movement and
events are independent, yet stand in a new relation to one another, so
that the conventional components of architecture are broken down
and rebuilt along different axes."37 The primary characteristic of
his filmic model is sequence: "a composite succession of frames that
confronts spaces, movements, events each with its own combinatory
structure and inherent set of rules." 3 8 The techniques of film
structure are applied to space. He suggests a composition of spaces
in which meaning is as dependent on the relationship from shot to
shot as it is on what is contained within the frame. At LaVillette, the
frame by frame Cinematic Promenade is designed on the analogy of
a filmstrip, where the privileged center--the participant--is put into
motion betweeen these frames. Each frame of the filmstrip--the
gardens or views--represents a privileged moment: viewpoints that
qualify, punctuate, differentiate and signify the unfolding of
experience. Pertuiset notes that Tschumi borrowed the
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discontinuities of filmic techinques such as frame, montage, cuts, and
juxtaposition to organize his park, but concludes that his sequential
structure is simply one of closed sets or poses related only in abstract
time:
In the context of Deleuze's analysis of the cinematographic image, it
is evident that in line wit our culture of equivalence, Tschumi
appropriated and aestheticized the technique of cinema, instead of
assimilating its properties which otherwise would have led his design
to a true emancipation of the 'viewpoint.' In its built form, the Park is
experienced as dichotomized between, on the one hand, thematic
units of experience each formalized as architectural objects or
gardens, and on teh other hand, the distance to be covered between
each of these events, analogous to the abstract time that connects
photograms. Although the vistas offered by the Cinematic
Promenade are more appropriate for twentieth century taste...they
are nevertheless predicated on the traditional dialectics of pses or
viewpoints rather than on a modem dialect of movement.39
In other words, the frames were idealized, not the contextual
relationship between the frames. The frames were set up
sequentially, but the relationships between frames is absent. "To
realize movement in architecture would have required an
understanding of it not in reference to the instrumentality of a
promenade, a path or a ramp, but in reference to a quality of
inhabitation that induces the visitor to 'see' in an order of movement
that encompasses the world."40 What Pertuiset insufficiently
criticizes is Tschumi's inability to engage any other senses besides
vision, which is surely a function of his cinematic model. '"Thus, in
spite of its updated imagery and the deconstructive postulations on
which it is conceived, the park lends support to traditional and
conservative values that include the most prevalent mechanism of
consumption of contemporary culture: 'the viewpoint."' 4 1
Pertuiset is thus challenging the conventional positionality
which leaves architecture as a function of objectified vision from an
imaginary abstracted viewpoint, and offers instead a theory of form
(not content) based on the interaction of vision and movement. She
argues that the camera has supplanted the human eye and therefore
3 9Pertuiset, "The Floating Eye,"
p.1 1.
4 0Pertuiset, "The So-Called
Cinematic Promenade of La
Villette,"p. 71.
41Pertuiset, "The Floating Eye,"
p. 11.
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human experience: "The camera as the key instrument that
supplanted the human eye became part of the ideology that equated
the real with the visible, that is to say with the readable...we are
today often inclined to attribute to reality itself the quality of
images." 4 2 A by-product of abstract viewing, we lose sense of all
of our perceptual senses--not just vision. But the rush to the tactile
only articulates the misunderstood relationship between mind and
body "Hence, we dichotomize architecture between on the one hand,
tactile, haptic and tectonic qualities, and on the other hand,
identifiable, typal, figural and symbolic aspects that are the substance
of our readings. However, when we oppose the tactile to the visual
or body to vision we corroborate the erroneous type of vision and we
endorse the mind/body split."4 3 Pertuiset resolves this dichotomy
through Schumacher's terms of human 'posture', our stance taken in
relation to the world. Posture redirects ourselves to more
experiential aspects to complement our readings. "When architecture
is conceived in the 'visual' world (of natural seeing), it remains in its
corporeality implicitly and explicitly situated in the material world
as well as in culture. Consequently no dichotomy arises between the
autonomy of forms versus cultural determinism, an issue that has
pre-occupied us since the eighteenth century."44 Pertuiset realizes
that modernity has not simply over-emphasized vision, but has rather
misappropriated it; and by opposing the tactile, no progress is made
in re-assessing the function of vision. Although essentially correct,
the danger here is Pertuiset's willingness to treat meaning strictly as a
function of vision. She accepts vision's current over-privileged
status, that emerged from a world based on abstract 'viewpoints.'
Thus she does not go far enough in challenging the viewpoint's
inevitable results --one being an over-emphasis on vision in the
world of aesthetics. She does not have a conception of experience as
a function of the interaction and integration of all of the different
senses, as Gibson says we should. Although we must acknowledge
vision's privileged position, we must not undercut the potential of the
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other senses. Not only is the filmic model an indication of this
position, it perpetuates the discrepancy beteen vision and the other
senses. Movement, for example. is never considered in terms of
auditory, tactile or haptic sensations. The emphasis on language in
architecture which she so sternly criticizes results from an emphasis
on vision (in quantity and in substance) and her theory must be
careful not to perpetuate this discrepancy.
The introduction of time and movement into the aesthetic
equation have brought about an emphasis on differentiation. As
Gibson noted, perceptual learning is very much a function of the
greater noticing of critical differences. The Good House: Contrast
c; a Design Tool, by Jacobsen, Silverstein and Winslow, emphasizes
differences in architecture through the articulation of contrasts. An
aesthetic theory of contrast uses distinct and opposing elements in
proximity, in order to intensify a work's effects. The authors believe
that experience is sharpened and made tangible by contrast, and that
the exploitation of oppositions can enrich and enliven phenomenal
experience. Perceptuals psychologists suggest that effective methods
of raising and/or maintaining characteristic levels of stimulation
would include the implementation of variations: in intensity as well
as meaning.4 5 In other words, by stressing contrasts, the authors
believe designers can stimulate awareness and therefore perceptual
comprehension of the physical environment. Their goal is to open us
up to different ranges of experience.4 6
The authors suggest that the theoretical concept of contrast is
fundamentally structured, and therefore can be understood and
applied. The authors develop design strategies grounded in six
primary architectural contrasts: inside/outside, exposed/tempered,
up/down, something/nothing, light/dark and order/mystery. We
should note that some of these contrasts are binary oppositions, while
45Fiske, D. and Maddi, S.,
Functions of Varied Experience
(Homewood, Illinois:The
Dorsey Press, 1961),p. 17.
46Jacobson, M., Silverstein, M.,
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others define the extent of the gradient of a common element; the
type of contrast is fundamental to the method of interrogating the
relationship between them. Though a somewhat elementary text, The
Good House explores and explains a rather remarkable/exceptional
range of possible relationships between oppositions within the
architectural contrasts described. Although the authors identify
specific relationships for each contrast, most tend to be variations on
a basic set of conceptual relationships or ways of mediating between
oppositions. All represent ways of thinking about linkages, and
therefore, successive order.4 7 Not only do the authors present
potential relationships between contrasting elements, they also offer
strategies for accentuating these interactions. One way is to
emphasize the polarity within the contrast through formal
articulations. For instance, in order to emphasize the enclosure of
interior space, the designer could 1) increase the concavity of the
space, 2) define its corners and edges, 3) increase its opacity, and 4)
decrease its size. A more complex method of creating more
comprehensible contrasts is to consider them not as separate and
distinct formal contrasts, but are capable of creating greater effect
through their juxtaposition. Rather than conceiving of "the
dimensions of environmental contrast...as independent variables, as if
in/out could be manipulated independently from exposed/tempered
or light/dark," we need to recognize that "environmental experience
is not just a collection of separate, isolated impressions, but is
organized instead into a larger, more unified structure."4 8 They
suggest that there is an inherent relationship, for example, between
up and light, or down and dark. "The dimensions of contrast within
some part of a building can either cooperate and reinforce each other,
or they can fight each other."4 9
Of the six contrast types that the authors identify, the
dichotomy of order/mystery is unique in that it introduces and
includes a subjective participant. Order assists in comprehension,
and mystery is integral with curiosity and the unexpected. Whereas
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we can conceive of light or dark or inside and outside as existing
without someone to experience it (in abstract space), it is extremely
difficult to consider 'mystery' under such pretenses. Mystery
fundamentally implies a temporal and therefore a perceptual variable.
In the other contrasts the value of time arises within the differential
relationship between oppositions. Like Messervy's schemata of
'security,' the order/mystery contrast defines a range of possible
schemata, but the polarity of either end can best be articulated
through a juxtaposition with the other. "It is only within the
framework of order in a house that occupants can pleasurably
experience the unexpected, and the mysterious...it is the
unpredictable places that have the greatest potential to command
attention and excite curiosity."50 The authors point out that the
experience of order and disorder, are key to expanding variety and
opportunity, and arousing interest. Referring to order and mystery,
the authors say "we need both." The author's example of the Havens
House demonstrates this concept of mystery in application of
contrasts. Designed by Harwell Hamilton Harris in 1939, the house
puts the participant into a process of spatial and organizational
comprehension that can only come about through exploration. The
bi-level house is organized around a central courtyard with the entry
on the upper level across a raised platform that passes through the
courtyard, but denies visual access to it. An awareness of an
"opening' is ever-present, but the actual view into the central
courtyard is witheld until the last possible moment. Although
ultimately movement and the relationships derived through other
contrasts (for example the contrast from servant to served is low to
high, and dark to light) are the true design organizing concepts, the
courtyard is the primary physical organizational entity, upon which
apprehension is necessary for comprehensibility. "..The design isn't
so simple that it can be grasped at first glance. Rather, the order of
the building gradually unfolds, becoming evident as one moves
through the building from the public street to the most private spaces.
5 0Ibid., p. 60.
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The building has order, but it also has mystery...(and this) sense of
mystery is furthered by postponing views of the main ordering
elements." 5 1 Such a work truly challenges, in the Brechtian sense,
the auratic image. At no point can one fully grasp the house as an
entity. Even the external view elicits a questioning of sorts. The
house is one to be experienced, in the complete sense of the word.
Although The Good House identifies and explores a broad
range of issues regarding differentiation through the concept of
contrast, several key weaknesses must be pointed out. The authors
argue that one of the underlying components to all contrasts is that
the opposing elements must be mediated by 'physical linkages', that
serve not to dull the distinction but to enliven it. The authors insist
that the relationship between two contrasting physical elements must
also take tangible form: "the connecting link between contrasting
pairs is itself an architerctural element..." As an example, they
suggest that "an interior (should be) linked to its exterior by a
covered porch that allows you to experience in and out
simultaneously." 52 When a porch defines the relationship between
inside and outside, contrast is no longer the fundamental structure of
the relationship; and the assumption that all contrasts must be
connected though some intervening physical element not only
emphasizes that element to the detriment of the contrasting elements,
it also, in its absolute nature, denies other possibilities. I propose that
the contrasts are more significant when we emphasize the theoretical
physical relationship, which have the most value as pre-conscious
relationships to elicit pre-conscious meaning. Such relationships
demand a mental action by the participant.
The second underlying component the authors identify is
that contrast should invade every varied dimension of perception.
But here, however, the authors push the concept of contrast too far:
"contrast theory demands that the bases of walls contrast somehow
with the tops of walls." 5 3 It should be clear that contrast does not
need to pervade every element, nor necessarily should it. Contrast
52Ibid., p. 5.
53Ibid., p. 71.
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fundamentally implies relationships between elements, not within
them. The authors' a priori conclusions defy the possibilities of the
manipulation of experience through subtleties. And, in certain
respects, the text remain synchronic, as if it was an objective
overview' of architecture; instantaneous oppositions are inherent in
the need to declare that all elements must be in contrast, in that we
might perceive those contrasts in an abstract, immobile section of
time. The focus should not have been on the contrast of elements,
per se, but rather the contrast of temporal experience. And it is
because of the underlying assumption that contrast must pervade all
elements that the authors are unable to translate their contrast theory
into concrete design strategies; the authors fail in this respect because
they provide few methods of reasoning for the application or
implementation of contrasts.
David Seamon addresses contrast as experience from a
position remarkably similar to The Good House's conception of the
order /mystery dichotomy. Jacobsen, Silverstein and Murray had
included the contrast of permanence/change as part of the
order/mystery opposition (even though change can be very regular).
On a wider scope, Seamon suggests that such a split is the
fundamental core of our entire being, not simply a minor contrast. "I
suggest we think about places in the context of two reciprocal
movements which can be observed among most living forms: like
breathing in and out, most life forms need a home and horizons of
reach outward from that home. The lived reciprocity of rest and
movement, of territory and range, of security and adventure, of
housekeeping and husbandry, of community building and social
organization--these experiences may be universal among the
inhabitants of planet Earth."54 Seamon conceives our life
experience as a function of the dialectic between movement and rest;
rest acknowledges attachment to place and being comfortable within
familiar surroundings, while movement demonstrates curiosity and
exploratory habits. The vitality of life, he argues, arises out of the
54Seamon, quoting Ann
Buttimer, A Geography of the
Lifeworld, p.131.
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Lifeworld, p. 132-133.
interaction of movement and rest: "each requires its opposite to be
so." This dialectic might be seen as a 'meta-schema' of contrast for
all of human experience.
Rest is associated with center, home and at-homeness. It points to a
basic human need for spatial and environmental familiarity and
order. Rest anchors the person's present in his or her past; it
maintains experiential continuity. Security, privacy, quiet, passivity,
contemplation and other similar qualities often have their context in
rest...Movement, in contrast, has links with horizon, reach and
unfamiliarity. It is associated with such active qualities as search,
newness, exploration, alertness and exertion. A person, through
movement extends his knowledge through distance, place and
experience, he becomes familiar with spatial and experiential
horizons that were undisclosed or obscure before. Movement helps
the person to assimilate places and situations into his world of
familiarity. In uus sense, movement widens the sphere of at-
homeness and dwelling. 55
Through movement and extension we seek out variation in stimuli
for mental stimulation and activation. By our very nature as human
beings we require both regularity and variety, order and change.
Thus, Seamon's exploration typifies the search for an architecture
that exists in time, but does not submit us to the terror of time and
unending relativism.
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Pertuiset in "The Floating Eye" suggests that "an architecture
immanent to movement appears indeed more appropriate to our
relativistic world than a nostalgia for transcendence."1 Such a
position evokes a response that is absolutely fundamental to this
thesis--what is it that makes movement and transcendence
mutually exclusive? Movement here refers to a personal, temporal
kinesthetic experience, whereas transcendence suggests an
excavation of elements of experience which are beyond time and
place. Neither concept is constituted through characteristics which
contradict the other. Pertuiset has misassociated the illusion of unity
in the aesthetic whole with transcendence, and has dichotomized
them from movement and relativism.
In this thesis I have attempted to lay the groundwork for
resolving the difficult juxtaposition of the transcendental qualities of
embodied meaning with issues of time and movement, in order to
derive an architecture fundamentally grounded in understanding
through the human body. It is my contention that all of this thesis's
preceding propositions are significant parts of an architectural
aesthetic that need to be recomposed in relation to one another in
order to evolve into a viable, tangible and applicable aesthetic theory.
They are not necesserily incomplete in themselves --I do argue that
we must be allowed to break down the constituent parts of the total
experience of architecture in order to facilitate their study-- rather, I
suggest that these theorists have their greatest potency in relation to
one another. The preceding sections unveiled possibilities for further
development of embodied movement and meaning., Accordingly,
1Pertuiset, "The So-Called
Cinematic Promenade of
La Villette," p. 12.
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this thesis seeks to open a wider architectural discourse, which
incorporates an embodied understanding of architecture.
This thesis is a continuation of a search for order that is a
form of self-knowledge. As designers, we need to appropriate this
self-knowledge, complementing our abstract analyses with an
understanding through the commonalities of body and movement.
Ultimately, as Harries notes, the arbitrariness our self-knowledge
attempts to overcome is a function of ethics: " Problems of building
and dwelling cannot finally be resolved by theory; theorizing can, at
most, hope to call attention to possibilities and perhaps help to recall
us to what matters. But without commitment, there is no escape
from arbitrariness." 2
Conclusion122
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